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ABSTRACT 
 
The reliability of protection systems has emerged as an important topic because 
protection failures have critical influence on the reliability of power systems. The goal of 
this research is to develop novel approaches for modeling and analysis of the impact of 
protection system failures on power system reliability. 
It is shown that repairable and non-repairable assumptions make a remarkable 
difference in reliability modeling. A typical all-digital protection system architecture is 
modeled and numerically analyzed. If an all-digital protection system is indeed 
repairable but is modeled in a non-repairable manner for analysis, the calculated values 
of reliability indices could be grossly pessimistic. 
The smart grid is emerging with the penetration of information-age technologies 
and the development of the Special Protection System (SPS) will be greatly influenced. 
A conceptual all-digital SPS architecture is proposed for the future smart grid. 
Calculation of important reliability indices by the network reduction method and the 
Markov modeling method is illustrated in detail. 
Two different Markov models are proposed for reliability evaluation of the 2-out-
of-3 voting gates structure in a generation rejection scheme. If the model with 
consideration of both detectable and undetectable logic gate failures is used as a 
benchmark, the simple model which only considers detectable failures will significantly 
overestimate the reliability of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure. 
 iii 
 
The two types of protection failures, undesired-tripping mode and fail-to-operate 
mode are discussed. A complete Markov model for current-carrying components is 
established and its simplified form is then derived. The simplified model can 
appropriately describe the overall reliability situation of individual components under 
the circumstances of complex interactions between components due to protection 
failures. 
New concepts of the self-down state and the induced-down state are introduced 
and utilized to build up the composite unit model. Finally, a two-layer Markov model for 
power systems with protection failures is proposed. It can quantify the impact of 
protection failures on power system reliability. Using the developed methodology, we 
can see that the assumption of perfectly reliable protection can introduce errors in 
reliability evaluation of power systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research Objectives 
 
Reliability evaluation is one of the most important tasks of power system 
analysis. During the past few decades, quantitative analysis based on probability theory 
has been applied to power systems and considerable progress has been made in power 
system reliability modeling and computation [1]-[67]. 
In addition, reliability of protection systems has emerged as an important topic 
because protection failures have critical impact on the reliability of power systems [68]. 
There are two aspects of protection system reliability, i.e. dependability and security. 
Dependability indicates the ability of the protection system to perform correctly when 
required. Unsatisfactory dependability corresponds to the fact that the protection system 
may fail to operate when required due to hidden or undetected faults in it. On the other 
hand, security is the ability of the protection system to avoid unnecessary operation 
during the absence of fault or faults outside the protection zone. Unsatisfactory security 
will result in undesired tripping of the associated circuit breaker(s). 
The goal of this research is to develop novel approaches for modeling and 
analysis of the impact of protection system failures on power system reliability. It 
includes the following specific objectives. 
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(1) Analysis of the repair factor that may influence the reliability modeling of 
protection systems; 
(2) Developing new perspectives for analyzing the impact mechanism of 
protection system failures; 
(3) Developing applicable methodology for power system reliability evaluation 
including protection system failures. 
 
1.2. Nature of the Problem 
 
Protection systems are indispensable to power systems. If assumed perfectly 
reliable, they will provide isolation of faulted current-carrying components in the power 
system to minimize the impact to the rest of the power system. However, the protection 
system itself is also complex and it usually consists of various types and sets of 
protective relays. Actually, it may fail to operate or cause undesired tripping action 
associated with dependability and security issues, respectively. Consequently, more 
components of the power system than necessary will be out of service and the reliability 
situation of the power system will be worse than that with perfect protections. Thus, 
assuming the protection system to be perfectly reliable may give optimistic estimation of 
the reliability of the power system. The nature of the problem can be illustrated by 
Figure 1-1 as following. 
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Figure 1-1.  The nature of the problem. 
 
According to Figure 1-1, there are hierarchical layers of three levels for this 
problem. These layers are listed as follows. 
(1) Layer 1 (the lower level): This is the protection system level. The main issue 
of this level would be how to model and evaluate the protection system reliability, 
considering interactions among the elements of a protection system. The possible 
research topics could be but not limited to traditional protection systems and the new all-
digital protection systems. 
(2) Layer 2 (the intermediate level): This is the current-carrying component level. 
The main issue of this level would be how to model and evaluate the reliability situation 
of current-carrying components, considering interactions between protection systems 
and the protected components. The possible research topics could be but not limited to 
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the impact of fail-to-operate protection failures and the impact of undesired-tripping 
protection failures. 
(3) Layer 3 (the upper level): This is the power system level. The main issue of 
this level would be how the power system reliability is affected by protection system 
failures, considering interactions among current-carrying components due to protection 
failures. The possible research topics could be but not limited to the influence on system 
states and reliability indices. 
 
1.3. Present Status of the Problem 
 
In the past few decades, considerable research has been done on reliability 
modeling of conventional protection systems. For Layer 1 and Layer 2, researchers have 
drawn attention to hidden or undetected failures of protection systems and a unique 
concept for the analysis of protection system reliability was introduced by the idea of 
“unreadiness probability” [69]. Based on this concept of “unreadiness probability”, some 
other reliability indices such as “abnormal unavailability” and “protective system 
unavailability” [70]-[72] have been developed in order to provide appropriate reliability 
analysis of protection system failures. Much of these works and reliability indices are 
based on the macro-level analysis of conventional protection systems in which the 
interaction is between the protection systems and the current-carrying components 
protected. 
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However, a new concept called all-digital protection system is now developing 
which is different from conventional ones in many ways. In such a system, not only 
relays are digital (computer relays), but also the output signals of instrument 
transformers which are now non-conventional are digital. These digital signals are 
conveyed to the digital relays through a digital process bus [73], [74]. Reliability 
analysis of the all-digital protection can play an important role in evaluating its merits 
and guiding its development in a cost-effective and reliable manner. 
A typical all-digital protection system is mainly composed of merging units, 
Ethernet switches, time synchronization sources, digital protective relays, and Ethernet 
communication media. An all-digital protection has more components and of different 
type than the conventional one, which should have some influence on its reliability 
indices. Thus it is also important to evaluate reliability based on the micro-level analysis 
in which the interaction among components of the all-digital protection system is 
considered. In recent years, some architectures of all-digital protection systems have 
been proposed and some reliability indices including MTTF have been analyzed [75]. 
However, this analysis has not considered the effect of component repair. 
For Layer 2 and Layer 3, researchers have been continuously trying to identify 
the effects of protection failures on power systems, to incorporate protection failures into 
power system analysis, and to enhance power system reliability evaluation considering 
protection failures [76]-[89]. Nevertheless, in spite of the mentioned efforts, the 
methodology of analyzing power system reliability including protection failures has not 
gone yet far enough. In typical composite power system reliability analysis, the 
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protection systems are still assumed to be perfectly reliable, which means that the failure 
of a current-carrying component results in the removal of that component, and that if the 
power can be redispatched to satisfy all loads, the system state is assumed to have no 
load loss. It is worth pointing out that even if the protection systems worked perfectly, 
the removal of a transmission line can lead to cascading failures as a result of the post-
fault overloading or transient stability problems but such events are not considered in a 
typical composite power system reliability analysis, although they can be included. 
However, when the protection failure modes and their probabilities are included, 
complicated interactions among current-carrying components do exist such that both 
component and system states experience intricate changes. There is a finite probability 
of more components than the faulted one being isolated. Thus, we need to reconsider the 
reliability situation of current-carrying components including the impact of protection 
failures, as protection system failures can change their operation behavior drastically. 
Analysis at power system level may be inadequate and even misleading if we do not 
incorporate protection system failures into the component modeling. 
When a fault occurs on a current-carrying component in the power system, the 
status of adjacent components may also be affected depending on the operation of the 
protection system. If the protection system is healthy and acts as intended, the faulted 
component alone is isolated. However, a protection system may be faulted but its 
unhealthy condition may not be known unless it is called upon to do its job. In such a 
situation, adjacent components other than the faulted one may also be isolated due to the 
operation of back up protection. To consider such a possibility, a three-stage multistate 
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Markov model for a single current-carrying component was proposed, which identified 
the most complex undetected faults in the protection system [80].  
Based on this three-stage multistate model, reliability analysis of the composite 
generation and transmission systems can be more practically achieved [90]. 
Nevertheless, the number of states for even a single component is still so large that direct 
application of this model in power system reliability is indeed limited. Thus, new models 
and concepts are necessary for reliability analysis including protection system failures at 
both the current-carrying component level and the power system level. 
 
1.4. Organization of Dissertation 
 
The dissertation will be organized as follows. Section 2 explores the impact of 
including component repair on the reliability modeling of all-digital protection systems. 
Section 3 proposes a conceptual all-digital SPS architecture for the future smart grid and 
shows how to apply the reliability analysis approaches. Section 4 focuses on reliability 
modeling of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure in a generation rejection scheme. 
Section 5 reconsiders the reliability modeling of current-carrying components with 
protection system failures from a new perspective. Section 6 develops new models and 
concepts for incorporating the effect of protection system failures into power system 
reliability evaluation. Section 7 gives the conclusions of the dissertation. The References 
and the Appendix are attached at the end. 
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2. RELIABILITY MODELING OF ALL-DIGITAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
 INCLUDING IMPACT OF REPAIR * 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and the Mean Time To First Failure 
(MTTFF) are important indices in the area of reliability analysis. Although their exact 
definitions may differ in various applications, we can give their descriptive meanings as 
following. 
In general, MTTF represents the average time between system breakdowns or 
loss of service. For reasons of avoiding confusion, the same concept is sometimes 
expressed as the Mean Up Time (MUT) or the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). 
In contrast, MTTFF represents the mean value of time from the moment system 
starts operating until it fails for the first time. It is, in fact, the concept of the first passage 
time applied to the reliability engineering field [2]. 
 
 
 
____________ 
* Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from IEEE. 
©2010 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, 
“Reliability modeling of all-digital protection systems including impact of repair”， 
IEEE Trans. Power Delivery, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 579-587, Apr. 2010. 
For more information go to 
http://thesis.tamu.edu/forms/IEEE%20permission%20note.pdf/view. 
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It is important to differentiate between the concepts of MTTF and MTTFF. We 
can illustrate this difference graphically by a system realization as shown in Figure 2-1. 
Here we use a sequence of Ui to represent each time period that the system is in success 
states, and a sequence of Di to represent time periods of system failures. Then MTTF is 
the mean value of all the Ui, while MTTFF is the expected value of U1, the first one of 
the Ui sequence. 
 
 
Figure 2-1.  Illustration of MTTF and MTTFF. 
 
This section mainly discusses the relationships between repairable and non-
repairable MTTF and MTTFF for all-digital protection system modeling. The remainder 
of the section is organized as follows. Section 2.2 first describes the analysis and insights 
of basic structures. Section 2.3 then analyzes an all-digital protection system including 
some numerical results. Section 2.4 is the summary of this section. 
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2.2. Theoretical Analysis of Basic System Structures 
 Consisting of Two Components 
 
Because the overall all-digital protection system can be considered as a complex 
of series and parallel structures, it is important to examine the theoretical analysis of 
basic system structures consisting of two components. This could help us not only gain 
an intuitive appreciation, but also understand better the analysis of the more complex 
structure of an all-digital protection system. 
 
2.2.1. Repairable Systems 
 
2.2.1.1.  Parallel systems 
 
The system structure and the Markov model for a repairable parallel system are 
shown in Figure 2-2. The letters ‘U’ and ‘D’ in the figure represent the up and down 
states of the component. 
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(a) System structure                                                           (b) Markov model 
Figure 2-2.  Repairable parallel system consisting of two components. 
 
2.2.1.1.1. MTTF of the system 
 
For steady state, the probabilities of system failure and system success are shown 
below. 
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The MTTF is the reciprocal of the system failure rate, i.e. 
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2.2.1.1.2. MTTFF of the system 
 
The calculation of MTTFF is more complex than that of MTTF and it can be 
obtained from the transition rate matrix of the system [2] as follows. 
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  001)0( p , 
 











1
1
1
 kU . 
Thus, the MTTFF of the system is obtained as below. 
  










 
1
1
1
)(001))(0( 111
1
11 RURpMTTFF k  
 
)( 221121
2
22121
2
122212111




  (2.2) 
 
2.2.1.2.  Series systems 
 
The system structure and the Markov model for a repairable series system are 
shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
 
(a) System structure                                                           (b) Markov model 
Figure 2-3.  Repairable series system consisting of two components. 
  
14 
 
 
2.2.1.2.1. MTTF of the system 
 
The system failure rate and the MTTF are given below. 
 21
21 

 


s
ss
s
f
sys
p
pp
p
Fr
 
 
21
11
 

sys
MTTF  (2.3) 
 
2.2.1.2.2. MTTFF of the system 
 
For a repairable series system, the full system transition rate matrix is 
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



R . 
Therefore, 
 )( 2111  R , 
 1)0( p , 
 1kU , 
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1
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





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  kURpMTTFF  (2.4) 
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2.2.2. Non-repairable Systems 
 
For a non-repairable system, the MTTF is actually the same as MTTFF. This is 
because when the system enters its failed states for the first time, it can never return to a 
success state. 
 
2.2.2.1.  Parallel systems 
 
The reliability of a non-repairable parallel system is 
 )1)(1(1)1)(1(111)( 212121
tt
ssfffssys eepppppptR
    
 
ttt
eee
)( 2121    . 
By definition [92], [93], 
 


0
)( dttRMTTF sys . 
Thus, 
 
2121
0
)( 111
)( 2121



 


dteeeMTTF
ttt , 
 
2121
111
 
 MTTFMTTFF . (2.5) 
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2.2.2.2.  Series systems 
 
The reliability of a non-repairable series system is 
 tttssssys eeeppptR
)(
21
2121)(
   . 
Hence, 
 
21
0
)(
0
1
)( 21



 



dtedttRMTTF
t
sys
, 
 
21
1
 
 MTTFMTTFF . (2.6) 
 
2.2.3. Differences of Repairable and Non-repairable MTTF and MTTFF 
 
It is easy to see that for a repairable system, MTTF is different from MTTFF.  
The reason is that when a system returns to success status after repair, it does not always 
return to the same state given that the number of success states is more than one. In 
special situations when the system has only one success state or it always returns to the 
same state after repair, the MTTF and MTTFF become identical and actually series 
system represents one example of such systems. 
 
2.2.3.1.  Comparisons of parallel systems 
2.2.3.1.1. MTTFF and MTTF of repairable systems 
From (2.1) and (2.2), we can see that 
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))(( 21221121
2
2
2
2
221
2
1
2
11




 RR MTTFMTTFF . (2.7) 
Since 2121 ,,,   are all positive values, we know that the result of (2.7) must 
be greater than zero. Thus, for a repairable parallel system, the value of MTTFF is 
greater than that of MTTF. 
 
2.2.3.1.2. MTTFF of repairable and non-repairable systems 
 
From (2.2) and (2.5), we have 
 
))(( 21221121
221221211211




 NR MTTFFMTTFF . (2.8) 
Again, we know that the result of (2.8) must be greater than zero because 
2121 ,,,   are all positive. Thus, the value of MTTFF of a repairable parallel system is 
greater than that of a non-repairable one. 
 
2.2.3.1.3. MTTF of repairable and non-repairable systems 
 
From (2.1) and (2.5), we get 
 
))((
)()(
212121
21221211




 NR MTTFMTTF . (2.9) 
It is easy to see that for 12    and 21   , expression (2.9) has a positive 
value. It means the MTTF of a repairable parallel system would be greater than that of a 
non-repairable one if these conditions are satisfied. 
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The physical meaning of this result is obvious. If one component of the 
repairable parallel system is failed, as long as it can be repaired before the other 
component fails, the system can still be in state of success. Given this condition, the 
repairable parallel system is sure to survive better than the non-repairable one. 
However, we find it interesting to note that the MTTF of a repairable parallel 
system could be smaller than that of a non-repairable one, depending on the sign of 
the numerator in expression (2.9). This phenomenon can easily be observed especially in 
case 12    and 21    simultaneously. 
 
2.2.3.2.  Comparisons of series systems 
 
2.2.3.2.1. MTTFF and MTTF of repairable systems 
 
From (2.3) and (2.4) we can see that 
 0 RR MTTFMTTFF . 
 
2.2.3.2.2. MTTFF of repairable and non-repairable systems 
 
From (2.4) and (2.6) we also have 
 0 NR MTTFFMTTFF . 
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2.2.3.2.3. MTTF of repairable and non-repairable systems 
 
Similarly, from (2.3) and (2.6) we get 
 0 NR MTTFMTTF . 
 
We can easily conclude from the above comparisons that for a series system, the 
values of MTTFF and MTTF are all the same, no matter the system is repairable or not. 
It sounds reasonable because any component failure of a series system will cause the 
system to fail. 
 
2.3. Analysis of All-digital Protection Systems 
 
Compared to the basic systems with only two components, all-digital protection 
systems have a variety of more complex structures and thus the reliability results are not 
easy to obtain directly. However, the methodology that we used previously to analyze 
the basic systems can still be applied to all-digital protection systems. 
Since the overall protection system will not work properly without correct signal, 
we assume the digital instrument transducers to be extremely reliable. Hence, they are 
not considered in the following analysis. For simplicity, we also assume that one 
merging unit can perform the full function needed for one set of protection, instead of 
several units in reality processing different signals, respectively. In addition, the Ethernet 
interface is assumed to be a part of the corresponding IED device (i.e. computer relay, 
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merging unit, Ethernet switcher) and its reliability is already included in these devices 
[75]. 
The main functional parts of a protection system are usually designed to be 
located in isolated places where the physical distances between them are far enough to 
avoid mutual interference. Hence, we can assume that all the components of the all-
digital protection system are independent of each other in most cases. In addition, the 
component state durations are assumed to be exponentially distributed. 
The major threats that can cause the common mode failures are intentional 
destruction (e.g. war, terrorism), fire, and more commonly power failures. However, the 
role of the protection system is so important that every set of protection is designed to be 
supplied by multiple power sources simultaneously, including AC, batteries, and UPS, 
etc. So, we can assume its power supplies to be extremely reliable. Now that almost 
every monitoring and control cabinet is designed with effective measures against fire 
spread by cables, we also assume the common mode failures by fire to be neglected for 
simplicity. As for intentional destruction, it is naturally not considered. 
Based on the previous assumptions, we will analyze a typical all-digital 
protection system architecture as shown in Figure 2-4 [75] but similar analysis can be 
conducted for other configurations. In this architecture, the protection system consists of 
two redundant full functional units and each unit comprises a set of digital protective 
relay (PR), Ethernet switch (SW), merging unit (MU), time synchronization source (TS), 
and Ethernet communication media (EM). In order to reduce the probability of system 
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failure due to time synchronization, the time synchronization sources of the two units are 
shared with each other and thus act as mutual backup of each other. 
 
 
Figure 2-4.  An example all-digital protection system architecture. 
 
2.3.1. Non-repairable System Model 
 
Reference [75] assumes this system to be non-repairable and its MTTF is 
obtained as 
 


0
)( dttRMTTF sys  
wherein the system reliability is given by 
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and in which the probability of a component i in its success state with a constant failure 
rate i  is 
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Given that the Ethernet communication media have a failure rate of 
1003.0  yearem , and all other components as 
101.0  yearprswmuts  , the 
MTTF of the system is calculated to be 37.3 years [75]. 
 
2.3.2. Repairable System Model 
 
As we know, if there is any recognized problem with the protection, utilities 
would either fix or replace the problematic components so as to keep the whole 
protection system up. Thus, we need to analyze the protection system reliability with a 
repairable model. Since the estimated repair time for any failed equipment is usually 
prescribed in power industry and the maintenance staff always conforms to this 
guideline, we can assume constant repair rates for our repairable model. 
 
2.3.2.1.  MTTF of the repairable protection system 
 
Using the concept of equivalent transition rates [91], we simplify the original 
reliability block diagram shown in Figure 2-5(a) [75] to the one in Figure 2-5 (b). The 
simplified system will have the same value of the MTTF as that of the original one. 
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(a) Original reliability block diagram 
 
(b) Simplified reliability block diagram 
Figure 2-5.  Simplification of the reliability block diagram. 
 
For the series chain A1 in Figure 2-5(a), the steady state probabilities and the 
transition rates are 
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Similarly, for the series chain A2 in Figure 2-5(a), the steady state probabilities 
and the transition rates are 
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Since the series chains A1 and A2 have the same probabilities and the transition 
rates, we can get the probabilistic results of the parallel structure A in Figure 2-5(b) as 
following. 
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For the parallel structure TS in Figure 2-5(b), we have 
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Thus, we could get the system failure rate as 
 ATSsys   . 
Therefore, the MTTF of the all-digital protection system is 
 
ATSsys
MTTF
 

11
. 
In order to get a comparable result with the non-repairable system, we use the 
same component failure rates as in [75], i.e. the Ethernet communication media 
1003.0  yearem  and all other components 
101.0  yearprswmuts  . In 
addition, we assume that the Ethernet communication media could be fixed or replaced 
in 2 days and all other components in 7 days, i.e. 
 
15.182)2/(1  yeardaysem , 
 114.52)7/(1  yeardaysprswmuts  . 
These are perhaps conservative values for the repair rates of the components. 
And we calculate the MTTF of the repairable protection system as 21016 years which is 
much larger than 37.3 years as in [75]. 
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2.3.2.2.  MTTFF of the repairable protection system 
 
For the MTTFF of an all-digital protection system, the formula that we used 
previously to analyze the basic systems is still valid. We rewrite this formula below for 
convenience. 
 kURpMTTFF
1
11 ))(0(

   (2.10) 
However, it is really not simple to utilize this formula for practical calculations. 
Unlike the analysis of the basic structures, we do not know just at a glance how many 
success states this system would have. We only know its total number of states as 
4096212   since the system consists of 12 components. In addition, it seems that we 
also cannot give the details of vectors )0(p  and kU  unless we know the number of 
states of system success, or the dimension of the matrix 11R . But the details of 11R  are 
even more difficult to know. So, we must use a systematic strategy to obtain the MTTFF 
value of the all-digital protection system. The key issue is that we can get 11R  after we 
obtain the full system transition rate matrix R which is 1212 22   in its size. The strategy 
to obtain this is illustrated in the following steps.  
 
2.3.2.2.1. Step I: Initializing the state matrix 
We initially form a state matrix which can represent the status of the system and 
all of its components. In this state matrix, each row represents a distinct state of the 
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system and each column represents a component state. For a system consisting of n 
components, the size of this state matrix would be n
n 2 . For our all-digital protection 
system to be analyzed, this state matrix size is 12212  . Now every element of this 
matrix represents the status of a component in a specific system state. If we use the 
values 0 and 1 indicating the success and failure states of a component, respectively, the 
complete system states can be represented by this state matrix consisting of exhaustive 
combinations of 0’s and 1’s as shown in Table 2-1. 
 
Table 2-1  Initial state matrix 
Components TS1 MU1 EM1 SW1 EM3 PR1 TS2 MU2 EM2 SW2 EM4 PR2 
State 0001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
State 0002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
State 0003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
State 0004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
State 0005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
                          
State 4092 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
State 4093 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
State 4094 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
State 4095 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
State 4096 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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2.3.2.2.2. Step II: Identifying system states of success and failure 
It is natural to think that we can use the minimal cut set method to distinguish 
system states of success and failure. The procedure could be carried out in three steps: 
Firstly, we find all the minimal cut sets of the system; Secondly, we use minimal cut sets 
to find all the system states of failure; Finally, the rest of the states are the system states 
of success. However, this method is not smart and convenient for our all-digital 
architecture to be analyzed. One reason is that it is not easy to find out all the minimal 
cut sets if the number of components of the system is relatively large. Another reason is 
that there will be some overlapping system states of failure based on different minimal 
cut sets. Unless we can identify all the overlapping states, this method is prone to yield a 
wrong number of system states of failure. 
Here we propose a better way to distinguish system states of success and failure 
for our all-digital architecture. Although this method is also based on the concept of cut 
set, the distinguishing difference is that we do not need to search all the minimal cut sets 
of the system. Since the reliability block diagram of this all-digital protection system can 
be decomposed into combinations of simple series and parallel structures, we can get the 
logical chain of the system as shown in Figure 2-6. 

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

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Figure 2-6.  Logical chain of the system. 
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In the previous Step I of initializing the state matrix, we have already used the 
values 0 and 1 indicating the success and failure states of a component, respectively. 
Now in the logical chain in Figure 2-6, let us replace each component by its state value 
(0 or 1) and treat the conditions “AND” and “OR” as the corresponding logical operation 
symbols. Thus, the logical chain in Figure 2-6 is translated into a Boolean calculation. 
And the final result of the Boolean calculation is just the indication of the system state, 
i.e., the value 0 of “System fails” indicates the system success and the value 1 as system 
failure. If we scan each row of the initial state matrix already set up in Step I and do the 
Boolean calculation, all the system states can be distinguished as success or failure 
without omission or overlapping. 
For our all-digital architecture to be analyzed, the number of states of system 
success and failure are counted to be 189 and 3907, respectively. After all the system 
states are identified, we can reorder for better use the initial state matrix as shown in 
Table 2-2, i.e., all the system states of success are moved to the first 189 rows of the 
state matrix and all the system states of failure are gathered in the latter part of 3907 
rows in our case. 
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Table 2-2  Rearranged state matrix 
Components TS1 MU1 EM1 SW1 EM3 PR1 TS2 MU2 EM2 SW2 EM4 PR2 
S
u
cc
es
s 
State 
0001 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                          
State 
0189 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F
ai
lu
re
 
State 
0190 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
                          
State 
4096 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
2.3.2.2.3. Step III: Forming the full system transition rate matrix R 
 
Since we have identified all the system states of success and failure and 
rearranged the state matrix, it is now possible for us to obtain the full system transition 
rate matrix R. However, the diagonal and off-diagonal elements of the transition rate 
matrix R are very different. They represent the single-step transition rates from a given 
state to itself and to another state, respectively. As a strategy, we need to know the off-
diagonal elements of the transition rate matrix R first and then obtain the diagonal 
elements from the non-diagonal elements. 
There are two types of relationships between any two system states [94]. Suppose 
we choose two arbitrary system states i and j. If we need at least two components to 
change their status for a transition between system states i and j, the interstate 
relationship is not a single-step transition and thus the corresponding transition rates do 
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not exist, i.e., the elements (i, j) and (j, i) of the matrix R are both zeroes. If, however, 
there is only one component, say component k, that changes its status between system 
states i and j, then the interstate relationship is indeed a single-step transition and the 
corresponding transition rates do exist. Further in this case, if the component k is 
working in system state i and fails in system state j, then the transition rate from state i to 
j is the failure rate of the component k, i.e., the element (i, j) of the matrix R is k . 
Similarly, the transition rate from state j to i is the repair rate of the component k, i.e., the 
element (j, i) of the matrix R is k . After we scrutinize all the interstate relationships of 
any two distinct system states, we can get all the off-diagonal elements of the transition 
rate matrix R. Figure 2-7 is a brief flow chart of this algorithm. 
Now it is easy to calculate the diagonal elements of the full transition rate matrix 
R because they have a definite relationship with the off-diagonal ones of the same row 
[2], i.e. 
 0
ij
ijii rr  
wherein iir  and ijr  represent diagonal and off-diagonal elements, respectively. The 
subscripts i and j here represent the indices of row and column of the matrix R, 
respectively. Then the diagonal elements can be obtained by the formula as below. 
 


ij
ijii rr  
Thus, the full system transition rate matrix R can be obtained after we know all 
of its elements. 
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Figure 2-7.  Algorithm to obtain off-diagonal elements of the matrix R. 
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2.3.2.2.4. Step IV: Extracting the submatrix R11  from the full system transition rate 
matrix R 
 
If we form the full system transition rate matrix R based on the rearranged state 
matrix as shown in Table 2-2 of Step II, we can see that it is quite easy to obtain 11R , the 
set of transition rates between states of system success. Because all the system states of 
success are located in the first 189 rows of the rearranged state matrix, 11R  is just the 
upper left square submatrix (size 189189 ) of the matrix R (size 40964096  ) obtained 
in Step III. In a word, we can extract the submatrix 11R  directly from the matrix R as 
shown in Figure 2-8. 
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Figure 2-8.  Extraction of submatrix R11 from matrix R. 
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2.3.2.2.5. Step V: Computing the MTTFF of the system 
 
As the final step of the strategy, we are now able to compute the MTTFF of the 
all-digital protection system by using (2.10). Since we have obtained the submatrix 11R , 
we can give the details of vectors )0(p  and kU  as following. 
The probability vector of system success states for the initial state (all 
components up) is 
 ]0001[)0(
s'0   188
 p . 
The unit vector of dimension k which is equal to the number of states of system 
success is 
 
T
kU ]111[
s1'   189

 . 
Using the same failure and repair rates of the components as we did in 
calculating the repairable MTTF, we figure out that the MTTFF of this repairable all-
digital protection system is 21029 years. 
 
2.3.3. The Influence of Repair in Protection System Modeling 
 
2.3.3.1.  Difference of repairable and non-repairable system MTTF and MTTFF 
 
The calculated results of our all-digital protection system model are summarized 
in Table 2-3. We can see that for the repairable model, the value of MTTFF is larger 
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than that of MTTF though the difference is rather small. In addition, the values of 
repairable MTTFF and MTTF are both remarkably larger than those of corresponding 
non-repairable indices. 
 
Table 2-3  Calculation of repairable and non-repairable system models 
Indices Repairable system model Non-repairable system model 
MTTFF 21029 years 37.3 years 
MTTF 21016 years 37.3 years 
 
 
The relative behavior of MTTFF and MTFF of repairable and non-reparable all-
digital system can be explained and proven as follows.  Our all-digital protection system 
can, in fact, be regarded as a combination of basic parallel and series structures. Since 
the basic series structures have no influence on the differences of repairable and non-
repairable MTTF and MTTFF, we can intuitively sense that their differences of the 
overall protection system are the accumulated contributions of its basic parallel 
structures. The proof is briefly given below. 
Let us first look at the series chain A1 in Figure 2-5. If it is non-repairable, its 
reliability would be 
 
t
ttttt
sPRsEMsSWsEMsMUsAsys
prswemmu
premswemmu
e
eeeee
pppppptR
)2(
,1,3,1,1,1,1)(







.
 
Hence, 
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 prswemmu
sysNN dttRMTTFMTTFF
 
 

2
1
)(
0
. 
However, if A1 is repairable, we already have previously 
 prswemmuA
  21 . 
Thus, 
 
prswemmuA
RMTTF
 

2
11
1
. 
Alternatively, it is not difficult to get 
 )2(11 prswemmuR   , 
 1)0( p , 
 1kU , 
 
prswemmu
kR URpMTTFF
 
 
2
1
))(0( 111 . 
Therefore, 
 NNRR MTTFMTTFFMTTFMTTFF  . 
Similarly, the series chain A2 will also have the same result. 
Next, let us regard the series chains A1 and A2 as two composite components 
with their derived transition rates. They definitely form a basic parallel structure, i.e. A 
in Figure 2-5, which has been discussed in Section 2.2. Once we have derived the 
equivalent transition rates for A1 and A2, the expressions (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) can be 
used. The only difference is that we need to substitute the subscripts A1 for 1 and also 
A2 for 2. 
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Similarly, components TS1 and TS2 form a basic parallel structure, i.e. TS in 
Figure 2-5. We can also obtain the results using (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9), just substituting 
the subscripts TS1 for 1 and TS2 for 2. 
Finally, TS and A compose the overall protection system which is just a simple 
series structure with only two composite components. As discussed in Section 2.2, we 
can easily obtain 
  ,
1
,, RARTS
RR MTTFMTTFF
 
  
 
NANTS
NN MTTFMTTFF
,,
1
 
 . 
Here RARTS ,,   ,   refer to the repairable systems and NANTS ,,   ,   are for non-repairable 
systems. 
It can be seen from the above derivation that, the parallel structure provides the 
actual contribution to the differences of the MTTFF and MTTF of our all-digital 
protection system. 
Since all the transition rates are positive values, using (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) we 
can conclude the following for our protection system discussed: 
(1) The repairable system MTTFF is undoubtedly larger than its repairable 
MTTF; 
(2) The repairable MTTFF is unconditionally larger than its non-repairable 
MTTFF; 
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(3) The repairable MTTF is generally greater than but under certain conditions 
can be smaller than its non-repairable MTTF. In other words, the repairable MTTF 
cannot be guaranteed to be greater than the non-repairable MTTF. 
Further for the third point, if we choose parameters in (2.9) such that 12 AA    
and 21 AA   , and at the same time that 12 TSTS    and 21 TSTS   , then the repairable 
MTTF will be smaller than the non-repairable one. A simple way to guarantee this is just 
choose failure rates of all the components sufficiently larger than the corresponding 
repair rates, as we will see later. Our previous numerical data shows that the repairable 
MTTF is greater than the non-repairable one. This is because all the component repair 
rates are chosen much bigger than the corresponding failure rates, which is normal in 
industrial reality. 
By the way, there is also a practical meaning to keep the repairable MTTF and 
MTTFF larger than the non-repairable ones. In power industry, if no in-time remedy is 
done for an out-of-work component of a still working protection system, the system will 
tend towards a critical situation and eventually go down much more quickly as more and 
more components go out of work. 
 
2.3.3.2.  The influence of repair on system modeling concerning MTTF and MTTFF 
 
In order to observe the varying trend of the system MTTF and MTTFF with 
repair, we fix all the component failure rates as in previous data and change 
simultaneously the entire component repair rates in multiples of the previous ones. The 
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result is shown in Table 2-4 below. The value of non-repairable MTTF(F) is also 
included in Table 2-4 for comparison. 
 
Table 2-4  Influence of repair on system MTTF and MTTFF 
Multiples of the original  ’s MTTFF (years) MTTF (years) 
10 209996 209983 
5 105015 105002 
2 42026 42013 
1 21029 21016 
2-1 10531 10518 
5-1 4232 4219 
10-1 2133 2120 
10-2 243 230 
10-3 55.9 41.1 
10-4 39.3 23.0 
10-5 37.9 21.9 
10-6 37.7 21.8 
Non-repairable system 37.3 
 
 
From the data in Table 2-4, we can see that as component repair rates increase, 
the system MTTF and MTTFF increase simultaneously. When component repair rates 
decrease, the system MTTF and MTTFF also decrease simultaneously. In other words, 
the system MTTF and MTTFF are monotonically influenced by the component repair 
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rates. This sounds reasonable since higher repair rates actually mean that faster remedies 
could be made to the failed components. Thus the mean time to failure (MTTF) and the 
mean time to first failure (MTTFF) of the system are likely to be prolonged. 
Table 2-4 justifies our previous findings. First, we find in Table III that for any 
given set of component transition rates, the value of repairable MTTFF is always larger 
than that of repairable MTTF. Secondly, the value of repairable MTTFF is surely greater 
than that of non-repairable MTTFF. 
In addition, as all the component repair rates decrease towards zero, the value of 
repairable MTTFF approaches just the value of the non-repairable system MTTFF. We 
can naturally see that the non-repairable system MTTFF is just the lower limit of the 
repairable system MTTFF. This can be proved as follows. 
As the conclusion of previous discussion, the parallel structure is the actual 
contributor to the differences of the MTTFF and MTTF of our all-digital protection 
system. Since we can obtain the result for our protection system in the same manner as 
for basic parallel structure just by the substitution of subscripts, let us look at the 
parameters in (2.8). If the failure rates are fixed and the repair rates tends to zero, we 
have 
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It is obvious that the numerator of this limit tends to zero while its denominator tends to 
a finite non-zero value. Therefore, 
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which means that a repairable system will eventually turn out to be a non-repairable one 
as all the repair rates become zero. 
However, the value of repairable MTTF is NOT guaranteed to be greater than 
that of non-repairable one. In fact, as the repair rates decrease to a certain value (e.g. 10
-4
 
smaller in magnitude of the original  ’s as in Table 2-4), the value of repairable MTTF 
would become smaller than that of non-repairable one. We further observe that the 
important condition that the repair rate of each component being greater than the 
corresponding failure rate is no longer satisfied at this time. The repairable MTTF also 
approaches a value but smaller than that of non-repairable MTTF, as all the component 
repair rates go down towards zero. It should, however, be noted that the equations used 
for computing the repairable MTTF assume a finite repair rate and cannot be used when 
the repair rate is actually zero. 
In summary, as all the component repair rates decrease, the value of repairable 
system MTTFF approaches that of non-repairable one, while the value of repairable 
MTTF approaches a value smaller than that of non-repairable one. Since a non-
repairable system has the same value for MTTFF and MTTF, it just reflects the fact that 
the MTTF of a non-repairable system has indeed the same meaning as its MTTFF. The 
interesting relationship between repairable and non-repairable system MTTF and 
MTTFF can be clearly seen in Figure 2-9 which is drawn from data in Table 2-4. 
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Figure 2-9.  The relationship between repairable and non-repairable system MTTFF and MTTF. 
 
We also find in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 that many repairable MTTF and MTTFF 
data seems too large to be acceptable in reality. This is because the pre-chosen 
component failure rates are very small in magnitude compared to the repair rates that we 
chose. If we fix our component repair rates and change simultaneously the entire failure 
rates in multiples of the original ones, we can find the computed results become more 
conservative as shown in Table 2-5 below. 
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Table 2-5  Influence of failure rate on system MTTF and MTTFF 
Multiples of the original  ’s MTTFF (years) MTTF (years) 
1 21029 21016 
2 5266 5259 
5 846 844 
10 213 212 
20 54.2 53.5 
50 9.06 8.80 
100 2.43 2.30 
 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
It is shown that repair plays an important role in all-digital protection system 
modeling concerning MTTF and MTTFF. For the all-digital protection system that we 
have analyzed, we can draw the following conclusions. 
(1) For the given component failure rates, the system MTTF and MTTFF are 
monotonically influenced by the component repair rates. As the component repair rates 
increase, the system MTTF and MTTFF increase simultaneously. When the component 
repair rates decrease, the system MTTF and MTTFF also decrease simultaneously. 
(2) For the given component transition rates, the value of repairable system 
MTTFF is always larger than that of repairable system MTTF irrespective of how small 
the difference is, i.e. 
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 RR MTTFMTTFF  . 
(3) For the given component transition rates, the value of repairable system 
MTTFF is greater than that of non-repairable system MTTFF, i.e. 
 NR
MTTFFMTTFF 
. 
In addition, as the component repair rates decrease towards zero while the component 
failure rates stay fixed, the value of repairable system MTTFF approaches that of non-
repairable system MTTFF. A repairable system will eventually turn out to be a non-
repairable system as all of its component repair rates become zero. 
(4) The value of repairable system MTTF is NOT guaranteed to be greater than 
that of non-repairable system MTTF. In fact, as the component repair rates decrease 
below a certain level with the component failure rates unchanged, the value of repairable 
system MTTF would become smaller than that of non-repairable system MTTF. This 
case is always accompanied by the violation of generally assumed condition that the 
repair rate of each component is greater than the failure rates of all other components. As 
component repair rates decrease towards zero, the value of repairable system MTTF 
approaches a value smaller than that of non-repairable system MTTF. 
Perhaps the most important point for practical purposes is that if an all-digital 
protection system is indeed repairable but is modeled in a non-repairable manner for 
analysis, the calculated values for the mean time to failure (MTTF) and the mean time to 
first failure (MTTFF) could be grossly pessimistic [95]. 
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3. RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF A CONCEPTUAL ALL-DIGITAL 
SPECIAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 FOR THE FUTURE SMART GRID * 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The Special Protection System (SPS), also called Remedial Action Schemes 
(RAS) or special protection schemes, is an automatic protection system which is 
designed to detect abnormal or predetermined system conditions, and take corrective 
actions to maintain system reliability [96]. It is well accepted that the SPS has critical 
influence on the power system reliability [97], [98]. Therefore, the reliability of SPS has 
always been an important issue in the research area of SPS [99]-[102]. 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
* Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from IEEE. 
©2010 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, 
“Reliability analysis of future special protection schemes”, in Proc. 48th Annual Allerton 
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, pp. 1614-1621, Sep. 2010. 
©2011 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, 
“Reliability evaluation of a conceptual all-digital special protection system architecture 
for the future smart grid”, in Proc. 2011 IEEE Power & Energy Society General 
Meeting, pp. 1-8, Jul. 2011. 
For more information go to 
http://thesis.tamu.edu/forms/IEEE%20permission%20note.pdf/view. 
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The smart grid is emerging with the penetration of information-age technologies 
bringing potentially significant changes in the development of instrumentation, 
monitoring, control, and protection systems in power industry, including SPS. As 
microprocessors become more powerful with even lower cost, they could prevail in the 
future for the choice of SPS logic solvers. It is notable that digital communication will 
play an important role in the future power industry. A new concept of digital process bus 
has been presented in IEC 61850 [73], [74]. With the realization of the electronic 
hardware sensor, a “one unique” secondary platform, called merging unit (MU), has 
been developed to interface all other substation equipments such as protection, metering 
and control devices, also called Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED) [103]. Using the 
IEC 61850 process bus, a merging unit is capable of executing the trip and control 
commands as well as communicating to IED its input signals including AC sampled 
values, contact status information, and a variety of transducer inputs [104]-[106]. 
Although sensors and actuators of the SPS are different in functions, their data flow can 
now be integrated in the same platform of the merging unit. 
In addition, non-conventional instrument transformers have already been 
available which can directly output digital signals of current and voltage measurements 
[103], [107]. These digital signals are all conveyed to the IED through the IEC 61850 
process bus. With the help of the Global Positioning System (GPS), a device capable of 
synchronization called Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) has been developed rapidly. 
PMU can provide synchronous measurements of phasors for the same time stamp and 
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become the foundation of various kinds of wide-area protection and control schemes 
[108]-[111]. If PMU is utilized as the SPS measurement device, the voltage and current 
synchrophasors over a large area can be easily obtained and the SPS actually becomes a 
powerful scheme with capability of wide-area protection and control [112]. 
It seems that the power industry is getting ready for more aggressive steps by 
replacing switchyard copper wires with plug-and-play fiber-based schemes [113]. We 
can envision that a possible SPS scheme in the future can be typically composed of 
digital logic solvers, Ethernet switches, digital communication media, merging units, 
time synchronization sources, and phasor measurement units. All the signals in them are 
digitally conveyed through a virtual IEC 61850 process bus. Since the all-digital SPS 
scheme has obviously more electronic components than a conventional hardwired one, it 
should have some influence on its reliability. Thus, reliability analysis of the all-digital 
SPS can play an important role in evaluating its merits and guiding its development in a 
cost-effective and reliable manner. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 3.2 firstly proposes 
a conceptual all-digital SPS architecture. Section 3.3 then illustrates the reliability 
evaluation of the proposed SPS architecture by using the network reduction method and 
the Markov modeling method to compute the specific reliability indices. Section 3.4 
gives the numerical case study of the proposed SPS architecture. Section 3.5 is the 
summary of this section. 
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3.2. Conceptual All-digital SPS Architecture 
 
There could be various configurations and realizations for an all-digital SPS in 
the future. In the area of all-digital protection systems, researchers have already 
presented some possible architectures [75]. Based on the idea of these configurations, 
here we propose a conceptual all-digital SPS architecture as consideration for future SPS 
development as shown in Figure 3-1. 
 
 
Figure 3-1.  A conceptual all-digital SPS architecture. 
 
Because SPS has critical influence on the reliability of the power system, two 
redundant functional sets are considered in order to achieve a high level of SPS 
reliability. In the architecture of Figure 3-1, each set can perform the full SPS function 
independently and consists of a digital logic solver (LS), an Ethernet switch (SW), the 
Ethernet communication media (EM), the merging unit devices (MU), a time 
synchronization source (TS), the phasor measurement unit equipments (PMU), and the 
PMU1 PMU2 
TS1 TS2 
LS1 LS2 
MU1 MU2 
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EM2 EM1 
EM1 EM2 
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digital communication media channels (CM) for PMU. In more detail, components TS1, 
MU1, EM1, SW1, LS1, PMU1, and CM1 constitute one set of SPS while components 
TS2, MU2, EM2, SW2, LS2, PMU2, and CM2 make up the other set. 
Time synchronization is so important to an all-digital system that the signal 
processing is meaningless without a proper time stamp. In order to reduce the probability 
of system failures because of time synchronization problems, the time synchronization 
sources of the two sets are shared with each other. No matter which source fails (TS1 or 
TS2), the other is assumed available immediately for the set of SPS missing its original 
time synchronization source. 
A merging unit device can have several functional modules processing different 
signals simultaneously. If the SPS is complex and needs to control several equipments, a 
group of merging unit devices may also be necessary to meet the requirements. But for 
simplicity, we do not distinguish either the modules or differences of the merging units. 
Here we just assume that one merging unit (MU1 or MU2) alone can perform the full 
function needed for one set of SPS. 
Phasor measurement units are preferred for future SPS applications especially in 
case the information of a large area is needed to determine the logic of SPS alarm and/or 
actuation. PMU Redundancy is also necessary due to its unique significance in data 
collection. Thus, two PMU equipments are considered for each location as shown in 
Figure 3-2, where PMU1i and PMU2i are mutual backup to each other for location i. 
Therefore, PMU1 and PMU2 in Figure 3-1 are not two individual units but two groups 
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of PMU sets. Specifically, PMU1 is the group of apparatus PMU1i ),,2,1( ni   and 
PMU2 is the group of apparatus PMU2i ),,2,1( ni  . 
 
 
Figure 3-2.  Illustration of PMU configuration for SPS implementation. 
 
Similarly, CM1 and CM2 in Figure 3-1 are also two groups of digital 
communication media channels CM1i ),,2,1( ni   and CM2i ),,2,1( ni  , 
respectively as shown in Figure 3-2. Here we suppose CM1i and CM2i are dedicated to 
the two SPS functional sets, respectively. However, the information of location i, i.e. 
data of PMU1i and PMU2i can be transmitted to SPS through either of the two channels 
CM1i and CM2i for best usage and availability of PMU resources. 
We will analyze the proposed all-digital SPS scheme using a repairable model 
because in practice, if there is any fault in the component recognized by either self-test 
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routine or manual test procedure, utilities would either fix or replace the problematic 
component so as to keep the whole protection and control system up and ready to 
perform. In addition, we also make some other assumptions for feasible reliability 
analysis such as: (1) The components of the all-digital SPS are independent of each 
other; (2) The component state durations are exponentially distributed; (3) The power 
supplies to SPS are extremely reliable; (4) The communication interface is a part of the 
host device (i.e. MU, SW, LS, PMU, etc.) and its reliability is included in the host 
device. 
Although the SPS scheme in Figure 3-1 is only one of the possible architectures, 
here we focus on how to apply reliability analysis approaches to the conceptual all-
digital SPS in the future. Evaluation of important reliability indices such as probability 
of system failures, frequency and duration of system failures, the mean time to failure 
(MTTF), and the mean time to first failure (MTTFF) will be illustrated in detail. For 
other possible SPS configurations, their reliability analysis can be conducted in a similar 
way. 
 
3.3. Reliability Evaluation of the SPS Architecture 
 
In the proposed SPS architecture, some components are exclusively used for one 
set of SPS such as the digital logic solver, the Ethernet switch with its corresponding 
Ethernet media, the merging unit, and the digital communication media channel for 
PMU. If any of these components fails, this set of SPS can no longer perform its 
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function properly. Thus, these components are actually functioning in a series 
relationship from reliability standpoint. As for the time synchronization source and the 
PMU, they are not designed as dedicated to only one specific set of SPS. Instead, their 
redundancies are for the reliability of the whole SPS application. Therefore, we can draw 
the reliability block diagram of the proposed SPS architecture according to the 
functional relationships of the components as shown in Figure 3-3. 
 
 
Figure 3-3.  SPS reliability block diagram. 
 
In fact, PMU, CM1, and CM2 in Figure 3-3 are conceptually aggregate 
components including all necessary PMU locations for SPS implementation. According 
to previous configuration assumptions, their reliability block diagram can be detailed as 
in Figure 3-4. 
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MU2 SW2 
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(a) Aggregate component PMU 
 
 (b) Aggregate component CM1 
 
 (c) Aggregate component CM2 
Figure 3-4.  Reliability block diagram of aggregate components. 
 
In general, it is not easy to obtain the reliability indices directly for such a 
complex system. However, we can use the network reduction method to analyze the SPS 
reliability. Here we suppose the failure and repair rates of a general component i by i  
and i , respectively. In addition, we use fisi pp ,,  ,  and fisi ff ,,  ,  for component i to 
represent the probabilities of its success and failure states, and the steady state 
frequencies encountering its state of success and failure, respectively. 
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3.3.1. Treatment of Aggregate Components 
 
In order to reduce the dimension of the problem, we need to merge the models of 
the aggregate components first before analyzing the system reliability. It also helps us 
understand the problem from a hierarchical point of view. We can achieve this by using 
the concept of equivalent transition rate [91]. Then the aggregate component will have 
the same values of transition rates, state probabilities, and corresponding frequencies as 
those of its representing group of individual elements taken as an integral part. 
 
3.3.1.1.  Aggregate component PMU 
 
For each location i, PMU1i and PMU2i are in parallel as we can see in Figure 3-
4(a). Hence, the equivalent repair rate is 
 
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The steady state frequencies are 
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The equivalent failure rate is 
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For the aggregate component PMU, it is all locations connected in series as 
shown in Figure 3-4(a). Thus, the equivalent failure rate is 
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The state probabilities are 
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The steady state frequencies are 
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The equivalent repair rate is 
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3.3.1.2.  Aggregate components CM1 and CM2 
 
The aggregate components CM1 and CM2 are both simple series chains as we 
can see in Figure 3-4(b) and Figure 3-4(c), respectively. Similar to handling the 
aggregate component PMU, we can obtain the equivalent transition rates for CM1 and 
CM2 as below, where }2  ,1{j . 
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After we have obtained the equivalent transition rates of the aggregate 
components, we can from now on regard PMU, CM1, and CM2 as if they were single 
components in the SPS reliability block diagram of Figure 3-3. 
 
3.3.2. Reliability Analysis of SPS 
 
3.3.2.1.  Reliability analysis by using the network reduction method 
 
As we observe in Figure 3-3, components MU1, EM1, SW1, LS1, and CM1 
comprise the subsystem S1 of a series structure. If we regard S1 as a new composite 
component using the concept of equivalent transition rate again, this composite 
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component will have the same values of failure and repair rates, probabilities of success 
and failure states, and frequencies of encountering success and failure states as the 
original subsystem. Similarly, we can use another composite component to represent the 
series subsystem S2 formed by components MU2, EM2, SW2, LS2, and CM2. Then the 
reliability block diagram can be reduced to a simpler one as shown in Figure 3-5. The 
equivalent transition rates of subsystems S1 and S2 can be calculated as following, 
where we suppose }  ,  ,  ,  ,{ CMjLSjSWjEMjMUjSj  , }2  ,1{j . 
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Figure 3-5.  Reduction of SPS reliability block diagram. 
 
Now let us see the reduced SPS reliability block diagram of Figure 3-5. There are 
two parallel structures in this diagram, i.e. components TS1 and TS2 comprise the 
parallel subsystem TS, while the composite components S1 and S2 form the parallel 
subsystem S. Again, if we regard these subsystems as two composite components in a 
PMU 
TS1 
TS2 S2 
S1 
S TS 
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higher level, we can further simplify the SPS reliability block diagram to a much concise 
one as shown in Figure 3-6. By the concept of equivalent transition rate, the new higher-
level composite components will have the same values of transition rates, state 
probabilities, and corresponding frequencies as the original subsystems TS and S, 
respectively. The equivalent transition rates of the higher-level subsystems TS and S can 
be calculated as follows, where we suppose }  ,{ STSi  . 
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Figure 3-6.  Simplified SPS reliability block diagram. 
 
The simplified SPS reliability block diagram of Figure 3-6 consists of only three 
composite components in series. Thus, it is now easy to get the reliability indices of the 
whole system of SPS using the parameters of composite components derived previously. 
The system reliability of SPS (i.e. probability of SPS success) is 
 
   PMUPMUSSTSTS
PMUSTS
sSPSp



, . (3.17) 
The system failure rate of SPS is 
PMU TS S 
SPS 
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 PMUSTSSPS   . (3.18) 
The frequency of SPS system failure is 
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The mean cycle time of SPS is 
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The Mean Down Time (MDT) of SPS is 
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The Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) represents the average time between system 
breakdowns or loss of service. For reasons of avoiding confusion, the same concept is 
sometimes expressed as the Mean Up Time (MUT) in the system modeling with repair. 
Here for our SPS architecture 
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3.3.2.2.  Reliability analysis by using the Markov modeling method 
 
We already know from Section 2 that the value of Mean Time To First Failure 
(MTTFF) cannot be obtained from the previous network reduction method. In fact, the 
calculation of MTTFF is more complex than that of MTTF. Based on the model of 
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continuous parameter Markov process, we can derive the ultimate formula for 
calculating MTTFF using the transition rate matrix of the system as follows [2]. 
 k
URpMTTFF 111 ))(0(

   (3.23) 
Here, 11R  is the sub-matrix of the full system transition rate matrix 
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R  and represents the set of transition rates from system success to system 
success. )0(p  is the probability row vector of system success states for the initial state 
(i.e. all components up), while kU  is the unit column vector of dimension k which is 
equal to the number of states of system success. 
In practice it is not simple to utilize this formula for computing the MTTFF of 
the SPS. So, we must use a systematic strategy to obtain the MTTFF value of our SPS. 
The key issue is that we can get 11R  after we obtain the full system transition rate matrix 
R  which is 1313 22   or 81928192   in its size. The implementation of this strategy is 
already illustrated in detail in Section 2.3.2.2. As a result, the structural expressions of 
the parameters needed in (3.23) are illustrated as follows. 
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3.4. Numerical Case Study 
 
For better understanding reliability analysis of the proposed all-digital SPS 
architecture, we give a numerical study as follows. We assume the same parameters for 
the same type of components, which are shown in Table 3-1. In addition, parameters of 
aggregate components PMU, CM1, and CM2 are given directly. The computation results 
of some SPS reliability indices are listed in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-1  Reliability parameters of components 
Components Failure rate (1/year) Repair rate (1/year) 
TS1 / TS2 0.01 876 
MU1 / MU2 0.01 876 
EM1 / EM2 0.01 876 
SW1 / SW2 0.01 876 
LS1 / LS2 0.01 876 
CM1 / CM2 0.03 876 
PMU 0.006 786 
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Table 3-2  SPS reliability indices 
Reliability indices Calculated values 
Probability of SPS failure 0.0000076 
Frequency of SPS failure (1/year) 0.00601 
Mean time to first failure (MTTFF) (years) 166.4 
 
 
The component failure rates do have an influence on the reliability of SPS. Table 
3-3 shows different results of SPS reliability indices by increasing all component failure 
rates to two, three, and five times of their original values while keeping their repair rates 
the same as before. From the data in Table 3-3, we observe that as component failure 
rates increase, the SPS reliability indices get worse accordingly. It simply quantifies the 
fact that the reliability of SPS will become degraded if its components are less reliable. 
 
Table 3-3  SPS reliability indices for different component failure rates 
Reliability indices Original Two times Three times Five times 
Probability of SPS failure 0.0000076 0.000015 0.000023 0.000038 
Frequency of SPS failure (1/year) 0.00601 0.0120 0.0181 0.0303 
MTTFF (years) 166.4 83.02 55.24 33.02 
 
The factor of repair also plays an important role when considering the reliability 
of SPS. Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-8 illustrate the trend of probability of SPS failure and 
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MTTFF of the SPS, respectively, by changing all component repair rates in multiples of 
the original data simultaneously while fixing their failure rates the same as in Table 3-1. 
From the figures we can see that increasing the component repair rates is helpful to 
enhance the system reliability of SPS. It sounds reasonable since higher repair rates 
actually imply that faster remedies could be made to the failed components. Hence, the 
probability of SPS failure could be reduced and the mean time to first failure (MTTFF) 
of the SPS is likely to be prolonged. 
 
 
Figure 3-7.  Probability of SPS failure for different component repair rates. 
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Figure 3-8.  MTTFF of the SPS for different component repair rates. 
 
3.5. Summary 
 
In the era of smart grid, the penetration of information-age technologies can 
bring significant changes to the area of instrumentation, monitoring, control, and 
protection in power systems. The development of the special protection system (SPS) is 
also likely to be influenced. 
This section proposes a conceptual all-digital SPS architecture for the future 
smart grid. Since the reliability of SPS is critical to the power system reliability, the 
focus of this section is how to apply reliability analysis approaches to the new all-digital 
SPS schemes. Evaluation of important reliability indices by using the network reduction 
method and the Markov modeling method is illustrated in detail. 
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The reliability of SPS is closely related to the reliability of its components. If 
components tend to be less reliable, the SPS reliability will be degraded. However, 
increasing component repair rates will be helpful to enhance the reliability of SPS. From 
the numerical case study, we find that the approaches applied in this section can quantify 
these effects and help in cost-benefit trade-off and selection of components as well as 
configurations [114], [115]. 
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4. RELIABILITY EVALUATION OF THE 2-OUT-OF-3 VOTING GATES 
STRUCTURE IN A GENERATION REJECTION SCHEME 
 USING MARKOV MODELS * 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Generation Rejection Scheme (GRS) is one of the widely used Special Protection 
Systems (SPS), accounting for about 21.6% of all SPS used by utilities according to an 
industry survey. It is designed to improve the transient stability performance of a power 
system. Figure 4-1 shows a portion of the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) together 
with an illustration of the GRS logic. In this power system line 12~13 and line 13~23 are 
critical lines. The function of the GRS is that when it detects a line outage on either of 
these two lines, it promptly trips only one generator to keep the other two generators in 
service [116]. 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
* Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from 
PMAPS 2012 Organizing Committee. 
©PMAPS 2012. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, 
“Reliability evaluation of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure in a generation rejection 
scheme using Markov models”, presented at the 12th International Conference on 
Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS 2012), Istanbul, Turkey, Jun. 
2012. 
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The working logic of the GRS is explained as follows. When there is a fault on a 
critical line, the breakers on this line will open. Thus an open signal (high level signal) 
from any of these breakers energizes the output of the OR logic gate. Then the high level 
signal from the OR gate output, together with the high level arming signal, will set all 
AND logic gates outputs in high level, which are inputs to the 2-out-of-3 voting scheme. 
When two or more of the voting scheme input signals are high, the voting scheme output 
signal is high; otherwise, it is low. The high level signal from the voting scheme will trip 
the selected generator [117]. 
We know from the GRS working logic that the three AND logic gates in the 2-
out-of-3 voting scheme play an important role. The design of this voting scheme can 
tolerate loss of one AND gate without problem regarding its output signal. However, if 
two or more AND gates fail, the voting scheme can no longer function correctly. Thus 
the reliability evaluation of these gates is one of the key factors to determine the overall 
reliability of the generation rejection scheme. In this section we will focus on these 2-
out-of-3 voting gates and regard them as a system for reliability analysis using the 
Markov model approach. 
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Figure 4-1.  The 2-out-of-3 voting gates in a generation rejection scheme. 
 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 shows a simple 
Markov model for analyzing the system reliability of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates 
structure. Section 4.3 illustrates an advanced Markov model for reliability evaluation in 
details with consideration of two different types of logic gate failures. Section 4.4 gives 
the numerical case study of both models proposed. Section 4.5 is the summary of this 
section. 
 
4.2. Model I - Simple Markov Model 
 
In practice, each AND logic gate represented in such a generation rejection 
scheme could be an individual electronic circuit module. In addition, all these three 
Bus 23 
Bus 12 
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working gates in a specific scheme application are often using the same type of module 
from the same manufacturer for reasons of interchangeable and economical solution of 
spare module backups. 
From this point of view, we can model the AND logic gates of the 2-out-of-3 
voting scheme as three independent and identical components. Thus, the state durations 
of these components will have the same distribution. Suppose their durations are 
exponentially distributed and their failure and repair rates are represented by   and  , 
respectively. Then the system Markov Model for the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure 
can be drawn as shown in Figure 4-2. 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  Model I - Simple Markov model. 
 
In Figure 4-2, 
0P  represents the system state with all gates in good condition, 
while 
1P , 2P , and 3P  refer to groups of system states with one, two, and three gates 
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failed. Also, we use the symbols for states to indicate their corresponding probabilities. 
The following equations for each system state can be simply obtained using the 
frequency balance approach. 
 03 10   PP  (4.1) 
 023)2( 201   PPP  (4.2) 
 032)2( 312   PPP  (4.3) 
 03 23   PP  (4.4) 
Since all state probabilities should add up to unity, we have 
 1
3
0

i
iP . (4.5) 
Using any three of the four equations (4.1)-(4.4) together with (4.5), we can solve 
and obtain the state probabilities. Here we replace (4.3) with (4.5) and obtain the matrix 
form of the equations as follows. 
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According to the 2-out-of-3 voting scheme designed, we can then compute the 
state probabilities of system success and failures by the following equations. 
 
10 PPP
s
sys  ,     32 PPP
f
sys   (4.9) 
The frequency of entering the states of system failure is 
 21  PFsys  (4.10) 
The Mean Up Time (MUT) and Mean Down Time (MDT) of the system can be 
obtained as follows. 
 sys
s
sys FPMUT   (4.11) 
 sys
f
sys FPMDT   (4.12) 
 
4.3. Model II - Advanced Markov Model 
 
Although the Markov model shown in Figure 4-2 (Model I) is simple, it might be 
inappropriate to evaluate the reliability of a practical 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure 
used in this section. The reason is that Model I is based on an important assumption that 
all failures of a gate are detected and known immediately after their occurrences. Here 
we refer to this kind of failures as detectable. However, the assumption may not be true 
in reality. 
A protection scheme including SPS can be realized by different types of 
components, including electromechanical, analog electronic, or digital electronic 
(microprocessor-based) devices. Each scheme could have a self-monitoring function. 
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Generally, the electromechanical one has the lowest capability to monitor itself. In 
contrast, the one using digital electronics can have the most powerful mechanism of self-
monitoring and may be even capable of self-diagnosis. No matter what type of the 
scheme is used, a warning signal will be sent to the control center through the alert 
message system once a failure is detected. Thus either operators or the maintenance staff 
can know the failure immediately and start the repair procedure. 
Therefore, detectability of failures heavily depends on the self-monitoring 
mechanism of the protection design. In practice no type of self-monitoring mechanism 
can cover 100% parts of the whole protection scheme, including but not limited to 
hardware, software and firmware issues. In addition, the self-monitoring mechanism 
itself may suffer a failure. Thus some of the device failures may happen but cannot be 
known automatically. Fortunately, almost all these failures can be identified by an 
appropriate maintenance test. 
Unlike some other active components in a power system such as rotating 
generators, most protection devices including generation rejection schemes are 
“dormant” during the majority of their life cycles. Although they can be armed for a long 
time in the working environment, they will not act until the predetermined action 
conditions are met. This special characteristic just reveals the fact that some protection 
failures are hidden and cannot be detected immediately until the protection is called 
upon to action or inspected for maintenance. In this section, we define this kind of 
hidden failures as undetectable. 
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Thus we have to take account of undetectable failures along with detectable ones 
in order to model our 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure more accurately. Suppose we still 
use   and   to represent failure and repair rates of detectable gate failures and use   
and   to represent those of undetectable ones. This important consideration will result 
in a more complicated system model because each gate now has three states and there 
will be 2733   system states in total. Here we still assume all three gates to be 
independent and identical and all transitions between system states are one-step 
transitions. 
 
4.3.1. System State with All AND Logic Gates Working 
 
We continue to use 
0P  to represent the system state with all gates in good 
condition and also its probability. Although the system state itself is the same as in the 
previous Model I, the transitions related to this state is slightly different than before. 
In this section we use a bar overhead and at the bottom of the gate number to 
represent its detectable and undetectable failures, respectively. So the system state with 
all gates working well is detailed by )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-3. We can see that the 
system state 
0P  can make transitions in six different ways because each gate can fail due 
to detectable or undetectable failures. 
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Figure 4-3.  System state with all AND logic gates working. 
 
4.3.2. System State with One AND Logic Gate Failed 
 
In this case, the 2-out-of-3 voting scheme is still working, though one of the gate 
has failed. We continue to use 
1P  to represent the system state and its probability with 
one gate failed. Since there are two types of gate failures, the system state 
1P  can be 
further divided in two different groups, i.e., the system state 
11P  with one gate failed and 
detectable, and the system state 
21P  with one gate failed but undetectable. For 
illustration, we assume gate 1 to be the failed one in both scenarios. 
 
4.3.2.1.  One AND logic gate failed and detectable 
 
In this case the system state can be detailed by )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4.  System state with one AND logic gate failed and detectable. 
 
We see in Figure 4-4 that if gate 1 is repaired, the system will transit back to state 
)3,2,1( . However, if another gate, say gate 2, fails before gate 1 being repaired, the 
system will transit either to state )3,2,1(  or to state )3,2,1( as shown in Figure 4-4, 
depending on which type of failures occurs on gate 2. As we can see in Figure 4-4, there 
are four possible transitions for state )3,2,1(  toward system states with two gates failed. 
 
4.3.2.2.  One AND logic gate failed but undetectable 
 
In this case the system state can be detailed by )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-5. 
Similarly, the system can transit back to state )3,2,1(  if gate 1 is repaired. The system can 
also transit to four possible system states with two gates failed. 
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Figure 4-5.  System state with one AND logic gate failed but undetectable. 
 
4.3.3. System State with Two AND Logic Gates Failed 
 
If two gates have failures on them, the 2-out-of-3 voting scheme will no longer 
function correctly. In other words, the system has failed. Due to different types of gate 
failures, it will be difficult for analysis if we use only one system state such as 
2P  in 
Model I of Figure 4-2 to model this case. In fact, we need three categories to classify all 
these system states. 
 
4.3.3.1.  System failed and detectable 
 
We use 
12P  to represent the system states of this category. In this scenario, the 
failures of two failed gates are both detectable. Thus the system failure can be identified 
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right after it occurs. Suppose gates 1 and 2 are the two failed gates. The system state can 
now be detailed by state )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-6. 
 
 
Figure 4-6.  Detectable System failure with two AND logic gates failed. 
 
Since each failed gate can be repaired, there will be two transitions for state 
)3,2,1(  toward system states with only one gate failed, i.e. state )3,2,1(  and state )3,2,1(
as in Figure 4-6. Because gate 3 may also fail before either gate 1 or 2 gets repaired, 
there are two other transitions for state )3,2,1(  toward system states with all gates failed 
as shown in Figure 4-6. 
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4.3.3.2.  System failed but undetectable 
 
We use 
22P  to represent the system states of this category. In this scenario, the 
failures of two failed gates are both undetectable. Thus the system failure cannot be 
identified after it occurs. Suppose gates 1 and 2 are the two failed gates. The system state 
can be detailed by state )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-7. 
 
 
Figure 4-7.  Undetectable System failure with two AND logic gates failed. 
 
We can see in Figure 4-7 that the mode of possible transitions for this 
undetectable system failure is similar to that of previous detectable system failures in 
Figure 4-6. However, the transitions are totally different due to different system states 
and different transition rates. 
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4.3.3.3.  System failure neither detectable nor undetectable 
 
We use 
32P  to represent the system states of this category. In this scenario, there 
are two failed gates but one is detectable while the other undetectable. This category of 
system states is the most confusing one because the system failure can neither be 
determined as detectable nor be defined as undetectable. It just depends on the system 
state where it comes from. For illustration, we assume gate 1 failed and detectable while 
gate 2 failed but undetectable. Then the system state 
32P  can be detailed by state )3,2,1(  
as circled in Figure 4-8. 
 
 
Figure 4-8.  System failure with two AND logic gates failed, one detectable and the other undetectable. 
 
There are two possible transitions to state )3,2,1(  from system states with only 
one gate failed. In Figure 4-8, if the transition originates from state )3,2,1( , then the 
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system failure can be treated as undetectable. Although the failure of gate 1 is detectable, 
it was before the system fails. When the system fails, it is triggered by the undetectable 
failure of gate 2. Thus the system failure remains unknown until next action or 
maintenance test. 
On the other hand, if the transition originates from state )3,2,1( , the system 
failure can be paid attention to because the triggering event of gate 1 failure is 
detectable. Thus the system failure can be regarded as detectable since other gates may 
be examined for their status. 
No matter the system failure is detectable or undetectable, the ambiguous system 
states of this kind can be handled appropriately as long as we group them as a separate 
category 
32P  different from previous system states 12P  or 22P . As we can see in Figure 
4-8, because gate 3 can fail either detectably or undetectably before any repair to gate 1 
or 2, there exist two possible transitions for state )3,2,1(  toward system states with all 
gates failed. 
 
4.3.4. System State with All AND Logic Gates Failed 
 
It seems unnecessary to analyze the details of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates 
structure with all gates failed, given the system has already failed since the failures of a 
second gate. However, we realize that even the system states with all gates failed can 
distinguish themselves from each other and have different modes that may impact both 
analytical modeling and maintenance scheduling. Of course this is again caused by 
  
81 
 
detectable and undetectable gate failures. We need to avoid using only one system state 
such as 
3P  in Model I of Figure 4-2 to model this situation. Instead, we have four groups 
of these system states. 
 
4.3.4.1.  All gates failed and detectable 
 
We use 
13P  to represent the system state of this group. In this scenario, because 
the failures of all failed gates are detectable, the system failure can be identified 
definitely. There is only one state of this kind and it can be detailed by state )3,2,1(  as 
circled in Figure 4-9. 
 
 
Figure 4-9.  System failure with all AND logic gates failed and detectable. 
 
It is easy to see that there are three system states that state )3,2,1(  can transit to 
or from, i.e., state )3,2,1( , state )3,2,1( , and state )3,2,1( . In addition, these three system 
states belong to the same group 
12P . 
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4.3.4.2.  All gates failed but undetectable 
 
We use 
23P  to represent the system state of this group. In this scenario, because 
all gates have failed but none of them is detectable, the system failure surely cannot be 
known right after it occurs. There is only one state of this kind and it can be detailed by 
state )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-10. There are three system states of the same group 
22P  that state )3,2,1(  can transit to or from, i.e., states )3,2,1( , )3,2,1( , and )3,2,1( . 
 
 
Figure 4-10.  System failure with all AND logic gates failed but undetectable. 
 
4.3.4.3.  All gates failed, two detectable and one undetectable 
 
We use 
33P  to represent the system states of this group. In this scenario, because 
two of the three failed gates are detectable, the system failure can be identified, too. 
  
83 
 
We notice that the two types of gate failures in the system state will impact the 
transitions. For better understanding, we suppose gates 1 and 2 failed and detectable 
while gate 3 failed but undetectable. The system state group 
33P  can now be detailed by 
state )3,2,1(  as circled in Figure 4-11. We can see that among the three system states 
that state )3,2,1(  can transit to or from, state )3,2,1(  belongs to group 12P  while states 
)3,2,1(  and )3,2,1(  belong to group 32P . 
 
 
Figure 4-11.  System failure with all AND logic gates failed, two detectable and the other undetectable. 
 
4.3.4.4.  All gates failed, one detectable and two undetectable 
 
We use 
43P  to represent the system states of this group. In this last scenario, we 
just cannot tell whether the system failure can be identified or not because two of the 
three failed gates are undetectable. It depends on the system state where it comes from, 
which is similar to the explanation of previous system state group 
32P . 
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Nevertheless, we can still know the impact of gate failures on the system state 
transitions. For illustration, we suppose gate 1 failed and detectable while gates 2 and 3 
failed but undetectable. The system state group 
43P  can now be detailed by state )3,2,1(  
as circled in Figure 4-12. We can see that among the three system states that state 
)3,2,1(  can transit to or from, states )3,2,1(  and )3,2,1(  belong to group 32P  while state 
)3,2,1(  belongs to group 22P . 
 
 
Figure 4-12.  System failure with all AND logic gates failed, one detectable and the other two 
undetectable. 
 
4.3.5. The Advance Markov Model 
 
In brief, we have ten groups of system states to model the 2-out-of-3 voting gates 
structure when the failures of AND logic gates are considered either detectable or 
undetectable. Table 4-1 is the summary of all these groups of system states. 
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Using the concept of equivalent transition rate [91], we can give an advanced 
Markov model for reliability evaluation of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure as in 
Figure 4-13. 
 
Table 4-1  Summary of system state groups 
System state 
group 
# of gates 
failed 
System 
failed? 
System failure 
detectable? 
Detail of system states 
0P  0 No - )3,2,1(  
11P  1 No - )3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
21P  1 No - )3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
12P  2 Yes Yes )3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
22P  2 Yes No )3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
32P  2 Yes Depending 
)3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
)3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
13P  3 Yes Yes )3,2,1(  
23P  3 Yes No )3,2,1(  
33P  3 Yes Yes )3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
43P  3 Yes Depending )3,2,1( )3,2,1( )3,2,1(  
 
 
Using the frequency balance approach, we can obtain a set of equations and solve 
for state probabilities of the advanced Markov model (Model II). This set of equations is 
expressed in the matrix form as in (4.13). The detail of (4.13) is shown in (4.14). 
 IIIIII VPR   (4.13) 
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Figure 4-13.  Model II - Advanced Markov model. 
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The state probabilities of system success and failures are 
 


2
1
10
i
i
s
sys PPP , (4.15) 
 
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i
i
i
f
sys PPP . (4.16) 
The frequency of entering the states of system failure is 
 



2
1
1)(2
i
isys PF  . (4.17) 
The formulae to calculate the Mean Up Time (MUT) and Mean Down Time 
(MDT) of the system are the same as (4.11) and (4.12), respectively. 
 
4.4. Numerical Case Study 
 
In order to compare the two different Markov Models for reliability evaluation of 
the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure, we use a numerical case study as follows. 
Table 4-2 gives the reliability parameters of the AND logic gate that we used for 
calculation. For simplicity, we assume that for the total number of gate failures in Model 
II, two thirds of them are detectable and one third undetectable. In addition, we consider 
the mean repair time to be 6 hours and the maintenance test interval as 6 months [116]. 
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Table 4-2  Transition rates of the AND logic gate 
Transition rates Model I Model II 
 (1/year) 0.03 0.02 
 (1/year) - 0.01 
 (1/year) 1460 1460 
 (1/year) - 2 
 
The computed results for both models proposed in this section are shown in 
Table 4-3 and Table 4-4. Table 4-3 lists the group probabilities of each model. For 
comparable states between models, the state probabilities of Model II with the same 
number of failed gates are added up. Table 4-4 gives the reliability indices of the two 
models. From these tables we can see that the differences between the results of the two 
models are significant. Compared with the advanced Markov model (Model II), the 
simple one (Model I) overestimates the reliability of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure 
significantly. 
 
Table 4-3  Group probabilities of system states 
State probabilities Model I Model II 
0P  (All gates good) 999938.0  985108.0  
1P  (One gate failed) 
510164.6   210482.1   
2P  (Two gates failed) 
910267.1   5107.429   
3P (All gates failed) 
15109   710242.1   
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Table 4-4  Reliability indices of the voting gates structure 
Reliability indices Model I Model II 
Probability of system failure 910267.1   5107.441   
Frequency of system failure (1/year) 610698.3   4108.890   
Mean up time (hours) 9102.369  6109.853  
Mean down time (hours) 000.3  2.733  
 
4.5. Summary 
 
The special protection systems are critical to power system reliability. As one of 
the most widely used SPS, the generation rejection scheme plays an important role in 
improving the transient stability performance of power systems. 
This section focuses on reliability modeling of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates 
structure in a generation rejection scheme. Due to different assumptions, two Markov 
models are proposed for reliability evaluation. The major difference between these two 
models is whether the failures of a logic gate are distinguished as detectable or 
undetectable. 
From the numerical case study, we found that the reliability indices obtained 
from these two models could be very different. While using the advanced Markov model 
with consideration of both detectable and undetectable logic gate failures as a 
benchmark, the simple Markov model which only considers detectable failures will 
overestimate the reliability of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates structure significantly [118]. 
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5. NEW RELIABILITY MODELS FOR CURRENT-CARRYING 
COMPONENTS INCLUDING PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURES * 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The three-stage multistate Markov model for a single current-carrying 
component [80] mentioned in Section 1 is the basis for new concepts and models 
developed in the following research. Thus, we need to review the details of this model as 
shown in Figure 5-1 before we go further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
* Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from IEEE. 
©2009 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, “The 
concept of power unit zone in power system reliability evaluation including protection 
system failures”, in Proc. 2009 IEEE Power & Energy Society Power Systems 
Conference and Exposition (PSCE 2009), pp. 1-10, Mar. 2009. 
©2011 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, “New 
models and concepts for power system reliability evaluation including protection system 
failures”, IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 1845-1855, Nov. 2011. 
For more information go to 
http://thesis.tamu.edu/forms/IEEE%20permission%20note.pdf/view. 
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Figure 5-1.  Three-stage multistate model of a current-carrying component. 
 
In this model, the faulted current-carrying component is supposed to be isolated 
by a set of two circuit breakers, denoted by set I , and this set of breakers bounds the 
protection zone of the component. In practice, a component may associate with more 
than two breakers, and the configurations of breakers do have influence on substation 
and system reliability [119]. However, it would be clearer and preferable to describe the 
modeling concepts assuming only two equivalent breakers for a component, each one of 
which represents the behavior of the practical breaker(s) associated with the relay and 
communication schemes. Thus, as the result of protection failures, a combination of 
breakers can fail to respond to a fault in the protection zone. The various possible 
combinations are indicated by subsets IIk  , i.e. 0I  (null), }1breaker {1 I , 
}2breaker {2 I , II  }2breaker   ,1breaker {3 . 
0
11 12 1310
23222120
0p 1p 2p 3p
10 2 3
0
1
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As shown in Figure 5-1, stage 0 is the up state (unfaulted state) of the current- 
carrying component. Stages 1 and 2 contain down states (faulted states) of the 
component before and after switching (the unfaulted components isolated by backup 
protection systems being restored to service), respectively. These down states are 
indicated by two numbers, the first showing the stage and the second the state number in 
that stage. State k  in stage 1 or 2 means that breakers in subset kI  fail to trip 
simultaneously. For example, state 13 means that the two breakers of the faulted 
component fail to trip, causing all its adjacent healthy components on both sides tripped 
by backup protections. State 23 means that after the checking process, both breakers of 
the faulted component are manually opened and then the adjacent components 
previously tripped are restored to service. 
The sequence following a fault on a component is as follows. Depending on the 
operation of the protection, one or more components may be isolated. Then after the 
correct identification of the faulted component, unfaulted components may be restored to 
service. Therefore, the transitions from the up state to the down states in stage 1, 
transitions from the states in stage 1 to corresponding states in stage 2, and eventually 
transitions from states in stage 2 to the up state are unidirectional. The failing, switching 
and repair processes are not independent and thus should be integrated into the same 
model with the probabilities of these states adding to unity. The parameters in Figure 5-1 
are defined as: 
  failure rate of the current-carrying component 
kp  unreadiness probability of breakers in IIk   
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k  switching rate from state k1  to state k2  
k  repair rate of the current-carrying component from state k2  
The Markov model described in Figure 5-1 assumes the switching (from state k1 ) 
and repair (from state k2 ) times to be exponentially distributed. It should be noted that 
there is a single transition into and a single transition out of the state k1  or k2 . It is 
shown in the Appendix that to compute the steady state probabilities for this special 
situation, the state residence times can always be assumed exponentially distributed with 
the equivalent constant transition rates ( k  and k ) equal to the reciprocals of the mean 
value of the state duration times, irrespective of the actual distribution. 
The objective of this section is to contribute to developing new concepts and 
models for including protection system failures in reliability analysis at current-carrying 
component level. The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 5.2 
describes the example power system to be analyzed to illustrate the basic concepts. The 
necessary assumptions on which the analysis is based are also given. Section 5.3 sets up 
the initial models for component failures caused by the two types of protection system 
failures. Section 5.4 discusses decoupling the complicated interactions between 
components caused by protection failures. Section 5.5 then establishes a complete 
Markov model for the component. Section 5.6 further simplifies this model into a more 
applicable and concise one and illustrates the overall reliability situation of individual 
current-carrying components. Section 5.7 gives the numerical case study of the proposed 
models. Section 5.8 is the summary of this section. 
 
 95 
 
 
5.2. The Example Power System and Assumptions 
 
For a clear illustration of concepts and methodology, a simple example power 
system shown in Figure 5-2 is used. Suppose two current-carrying components (e.g. 
transmission lines) A and B are connected in series and each is bounded by two circuit 
breakers, i.e. A1, A2, and B1, B2, respectively. In Figure 5-2, S1 and S2 are two source 
systems supplying power while L is the load fed by components A and B together. 
 
 
Figure 5-2.  Example power system. 
 
Generally, the protection systems are designed in the following way. If there is a 
fault on component B and the protective relay installed at location B1 fails to trip, the 
relay installed at location A1 will provide remote backup protection while the relay at A2 
will provide local backup protection. Thus, component A will be tripped. For simplicity, 
we do not distinguish the local backup and remote backup any more since they actually 
have the same result that A is tripped. We just assume that the protection system of 
component A (protection A) acts as the backup to the protection system of component B 
(protection B). Similarly, protection B is also assumed to be the backup to protection A 
in case breaker A2 fails to trip when there is a fault on component A. 
BA
1B 2B
1S 2S
2A1A
L
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In addition, we assume that source system S1 provides backup protection to 
component A in case breaker A1 fails to trip when there is a fault on component A, while 
source system S2 provides backup protection to component B in case breaker B2 fails to 
trip when there is a fault on component B. These backup protections will detach the 
source system from the corresponding component (A or B) when called upon to act. 
Some other important assumptions are listed as following. These assumptions are 
generally made in power system reliability analysis. 
(1) The component state durations are exponentially distributed, which implies 
that all transition rates are constant. 
(2) The failures of protection systems happen independently of the faults of 
current-carrying components. 
(3) The repair of protection systems is always faster than that of the 
corresponding protected components, which is normal in power industry. 
(4) All the protection systems are well coordinated and all the backup functions 
are perfectly reliable. 
(5) All the source systems and the buses connecting components and feeding 
loads are perfectly reliable. 
(6) All the source systems and the components have sufficient power capacity to 
satisfy the load. 
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5.3. Initial Modeling of Protection System Failures 
 
There are two significant failure modes of the protection system [80]. One is the 
fail-to-operate mode, which refers to undetected or hidden faults of the protection system 
and is associated with the concept of unreadiness probability. The other is the undesired-
tripping mode, in which the unfaulted component is tripped by its faulted protection 
system. 
For the fail-to-operate protection failures of components A and B, they can be 
modeled by the three-stage multistate models as shown in Figure 5-3(a) and Figure 5-
3(b), respectively. In fact, these models are directly obtained from that in Figure 5-1, 
with the only difference being of component symbols A and B added. 
As to undesired-tripping protection failures, they can increase the component 
down-state probability. However, we notice that this failure mode of a protection system 
has influence only on its own component without interaction with other components. In 
other words, protection A will only trip component A and protection B will only trip 
component B. Thus, we can use a two-state process to model the effect of this failure 
mode, as state A  in Figure 5-4(a) and state B  in Figure 5-4(b). 
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(a) Component A 
 
 
(b) Component B 
Figure 5-3.  Modeling a component with its fail-to-operate protection failures. 
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(a) Component A 
 
 
(b) Component B 
Figure 5-4.  Modeling a component with its protection system failures. 
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successfully incorporate the two significant failure modes of the protection system into 
the current-carrying component modeling. 
 
5.4. Interaction Decoupling and the Complete Model 
 
We need to point out that the Markov models in Figure 5-4 are still incomplete 
for the components because they have not depicted the overall reliability status of the 
components. 
In fact, we observe that a component is possible to trip without any fault either 
on itself or with its protection system. It is induced by component interactions but is not 
reflected in the models of Figure 5-4. For example, an uncleared fault on component B 
could trip component A, which would be explained in the following. Thus, it is quite 
necessary to decouple the complex interactions between current-carrying components 
caused by their protection system failures. 
 
5.4.1. Decoupling Component Interaction by Protection Failures 
 for Modeling Component A 
 
As in the example system of Figure 5-2, if there is a fault on component B and 
protection B fails to trip its breaker B1, protection B is in the situation of unreadiness to 
trip. Since protection A is the backup of protection B, it will trip component A to isolate 
faulted component B. In such case, there is no fault on component A, nor is with 
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protection A, but component A is down. This is the interaction between components A 
and B caused by failures of protection B. 
Since both components are down simultaneously due to backup protection, we 
can model the effect of this interaction as a special common mode failure of components 
A and B. However, there are two cases we need to consider. 
In one case, breaker B2 trips but breaker B1 fails to trip. There would be three 
steps and the state transitions of each component in these steps are illustrated in Table 5-
1. The state 11
~
BA  in Table 5-1 is a new down state of component A caused by failures of 
protection B. The subscript of the state symbol is used to indicate the source of impact. 
 
Table 5-1  State transitions of components in Case One 
Step 
Transition of component B Transition of component A 
Direction Rate Direction Rate 
1 110 BB   BBp 1  110
~
BAA   BBp 1  
2 2111 BB   1B  011
~
AAB   1B  
3 021 BB   1B  Independent of component B 
 
 
In step 1, component B transfers from state 0B  to state 11B  while component A 
transfers from state 0A  to the new down state 11
~
BA . Components A and B have the same 
failure rate BBp 1  due to common mode failure of the two components. In step 2, 
component B transfers from before-switching state 11B  to after-switching state 21B  
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while component A returns from state 11
~
BA  (down state) to state 0A  (up state). 
Components A and B also have the same transition rate 1B  because of the switching 
operation. In step 3, component B transfers from state 21B  to state 0B  with the repair 
rate 1B , but this time the transition of component A is independent of component B. 
Thus, if we are only concerned with transitions between up and down states of 
component A, this case of common mode failure makes component A experience a two-
state process with its transition rates derived from component B. 
In the other case, both of the breakers B1 and B2 fail to trip. Its analysis is quite 
similar to the first case if we only consider its impact on component A. There would also 
be three steps and the state transitions of each component in these steps are shown in 
Table 5-2. The state 13
~
BA  in Table 5-2 is another new down state of component A caused 
by failures of protection B. 
 
Table 5-2  State transitions of components in Case Two 
Step 
Transition of component B Transition of component A 
Direction Rate Direction Rate 
1 130 BB   BBp 3  130
~
BAA   BBp 3  
2 2313 BB   3B  013
~
AAB   3B  
3 023 BB   3B  Independent of component B 
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Therefore, the interactions between components by their protection system 
failures can be decoupled by modeling them as common mode failures. Given protection 
A is the backup of protection B as in the example power system of Figure 5-2, their 
interaction is caused by the unreadiness probability of protection B associated with 
breaker B1. Its impact on component A can be modeled by two two-state processes 
associated with states 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA , respectively. Figure 5-5 gives an intuitive picture 
of decoupling interactions caused by failures of protection B. 
 
 
Figure 5-5.  Decoupling interactions caused by failures of protection B. 
 
It is necessary to point out that the unreadiness probability of protection B 
associated only with breaker B2 should not have such influence on component A. Since 
breaker B1 is tripped by protection B (primary protection) and component B is detached 
from component A, protection A (backup protection) will not operate. Thus, there is no 
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interaction between the two components. In fact, component B will also be detached 
from source system S2 by its protection (backup protection) in this situation. 
 
5.4.2. Decoupling Component Interaction by Protection Failures 
 for Modeling Component B 
 
Since protection B is also the backup of protection A, there exists another 
component interaction which is now caused by the unreadiness probability of protection 
A associated with breaker A2. However, the decoupling methodology of this interaction 
is all the same as that of the previous one. 
The interaction between components A and B caused by failures of protection A 
can also be decoupled by modeling them as common mode failures. There are also two 
cases that are necessary to consider as shown in Figure 5-6. Its impact on component B 
can be modeled by two independent two-state processes represented by states 12
~
AB  and 
13
~
AB , respectively. The transition rates of these new processes of component B as shown 
in Figure 5-6 are actually derived from the existing model of component A as in Figure 
5-4(a). 
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Figure 5-6.  Decoupling interactions caused by failures of protection A. 
 
For the similar reason, the unreadiness probability of protection A associated 
only with breaker A1 should not have interactive impact on component B. As we have 
assumed before, component A will be detached from source system S1 by its protection 
(backup protection) in this situation, too. 
 
5.4.3. The Complete Markov Model for Components 
 
After we have decoupled the interactions between current-carrying components 
caused by their protection system failures, we add new states to the initial component 
models in Figure 5-4 for completeness. Now the complete Markov model for the 
components can be obtained as shown in Figure 5-7, which is capable of describing their 
overall reliability situation. 
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(a) Component A 
 
 
(b) Component B 
Figure 5-7.  Complete Markov model for current-carrying components. 
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In Figure 5-7, we should bear in mind that although the new states 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA  
of component A are individually presented in this component modeling, they are always 
dependent on some down states of component B as already illustrated in Figure 5-5. In 
addition, the transition rates of these new states are derived from those of component B. 
Similarly, the individually presented new states 12
~
AB  and 13
~
AB  of component B are 
always dependent on some down states of component A as illustrated in Figure 5-6. The 
transition rates of these new states are also derived from those of component A. 
 
5.5. Simplification of the Complete Model 
 
Although the reliability models in Figure 5-7 for current-carrying components 
are complete, they appear to be so complex that it may discourage their application in 
the analysis of power systems. Thus, it is necessary to simplify these Markov models. 
For reasons of avoiding confusion, we first use the model of component A to illustrate 
the simplification process in detail. 
 
5.5.1. Simplification of Modeling Component Failure Due to Its Own Fault 
 
We have depicted failures of component A due to its own fault by a three-stage 
multistate model, which is already shown in Figure 5-3(a) and is also a significant part in 
Figure 5-7(a). This model not only incorporates fail-to-operate faults of protection A, but 
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also identifies each case of unreadiness probability of protection A. It is important and 
indispensable to model component A in this way in order to decouple the component 
interactions caused by the unreadiness probability of protection A and further to identify 
the impact of the interactions on other related components. 
However, it is unnecessary to use such a sophisticated model directly because 
power system reliability is determined significantly by up-and-down status of its 
components. We can next see that the unreadiness probability of protection A cannot 
influence component A regarding its up and down states. 
In case there is a fault on component A, it will surely transfer from the up state to 
down state (either by primary protection or backup protection), despite the status of 
protection A. In case component A is in the up state, the undetected faults of protection 
A cannot turn component A into down state unless a fault happens to occur on 
component A. These facts just imply that the unreadiness probability of protection A 
cannot alter the failure rate of component A. 
Although there are various states before and after switching in the previous three-
stage multistate model of component A, all these states (in stages 1 and 2) belong to and 
exhaustively compose the down state of component A due to its own fault. If we assume 
that the repair of protection systems is faster than that of the corresponding protected 
components, which is normal in the power industry, the repair rate of component A from 
the down state to up state will also not be changed by the unreadiness probability of 
protection A. 
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Therefore, the unreadiness probability of protection A can only influence other 
components but not component A regarding up-and-down status. We no longer need to 
identify the down-state details of component A according to the unreadiness probability 
of protection A. We can simply use a two-state process represented by state Aˆ  in Figure 
5-8 to model the failures of component A due to its own fault. This model is actually all 
the same as if we had the perfect protection of component A. The transition rates are just 
the parameters of component A, i.e., its failure rate A  and its repair rate A . 
 
 
Figure 5-8.  Modeling failures of component A due to its own fault. 
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Now we obtain a new concise model for component A as shown in Figure 5-9, 
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caused by protection system failures, but also incorporates sufficient information for 
applicable quantitative analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5-9.  Simplified model for component A. 
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00
ˆˆ
A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP


  . (5.1) 
For the process between states 0A  and A , we have 
 
00 A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP





 . (5.2) 
For the process between states 0A  and 11
~
BA , we have 
 
0
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111111110 ~
~
~~~~
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A
A
AAAAA PPPP
B
B
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
  . (5.3) 
For the process between states 0A  and 13
~
BA , we have 
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  . (5.4) 
It is obvious that 
 1
~~ˆ
13110

BB AAAAA
PPPPP . (5.5) 
Substitute (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), and (5.4) into (5.5), we can get 
 1~
~
~
~
1
13
13
11
11
0













B
B
B
B
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AP








. (5.6) 
Therefore, 
 
A
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P
1
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 , (5.7) 
wherein 
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and 
 11 1111
~     ,
~
BABBA BB
p   , (5.9) 
 33 1313
~     ,
~
BABBA BB
p   . (5.10) 
The probabilities of all the down states are 
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K
P


 . (5.14) 
Let us look at the down states of the simplified complete model for component A 
in Figure 5-9 again. There is something interesting if we compare them from various 
points of view. 
From the viewpoint of faults occurring on primary or secondary equipments, all 
the down states of component A can be classified into two groups. The first group is 
component A failure caused by faults on the component itself, which consists of the 
down state Aˆ  only. All other down states A  , 11
~
BA , and 13
~
BA  belong to the second 
group, which represents component A failure caused by protection system failures. If we 
remove the second group, the model of component A can actually fall back to the one 
with perfect protection systems. 
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From the viewpoint of tripping effect, all the down states of component A can 
also be generalized into two types. The down state Aˆ  is the only one of the first type, 
which represents “desired” tripping of component A because there is a fault on 
component A. The second type includes all other down states A , 11
~
BA , and 13
~
BA , which 
can be regarded as “undesired” tripping of component A because they have the same 
tripping effect that component A is down without its own fault. It means that states 11
~
BA  
and 13
~
BA  are like virtual undesired-tripping states, just the same tripping effect for 
component A as the real undesired-tripping state A . However, the down states 11
~
BA and 
13
~
BA  are actually caused by the unreadiness probability of protection B. This important 
tripping effect just reminds us that the two apparently different failure modes of 
protection systems, i.e., the undesired-tripping mode and the fail-to-operate mode, have 
intrinsically intimate relationship with each other. The impact of the fail-to-operate 
mode, i.e., unreadiness probability, of protection B is showing up as an undesired-
tripping mode of protection A due to backup function. It is this effect transformation of 
protection failure modes that causes the interactions between current-carrying 
components so complex and confusing. Now we know that after proper decoupling, the 
resulting down states A , 11
~
BA , and 13
~
BA  can all be regarded as undesired-tripping states 
of component A. The only difference among them is their transition rates because they 
are provided by different components. 
It is worth noting that although the simplified component model shown in Figure 
5-9 is better for use in computations, its equivalent parameters must be derived from data 
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which is only available for the corresponding complete Markov model shown in Figure 
5-7(a). These parameters are derived using equations (5.9) and (5.10). 
 
5.5.3. The Simplified Model for Component B 
 
In the same way, we can obtain from Figure 5-7(b) the simplified model for 
component B as shown in Figure 5-10, in which 0B , Bˆ , B , 12
~
AB  and 13
~
AB  represent the 
up state, the down state due to faults on component B, the down state due to undesired-
tripping failure of protection B, and the down states due to the unreadiness probability of 
protection A, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5-10.  Simplified model for component B. 
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If we use 
0B
P , BPˆ , BP , 12
~
AB
P , and 
13
~
AB
P  to represent the probabilities of states 0B , 
Bˆ , B , 12
~
AB  and 13
~
AB , respectively, they can be determined to be given by 
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 BB
B
B
K
P


ˆ , (5.16) 
 
BB
B
B
K
P




 , (5.17) 
 
12
12
12 ~
~
~
A
A
A
BB
B
B
K
P


 , (5.18) 
 
13
13
13 ~
~
~
A
A
A
BB
B
B
K
P


 , (5.19) 
wherein 
 
13
13
12
12
~
~
~
~
1
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
BK











 , (5.20) 
and 
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~     ,
~
ABAAB AA
p   , (5.21) 
 33 1313
~     ,
~
ABAAB AA
p   . (5.22) 
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5.6. Numerical Case Study 
 
In brief, the simplified models that we have built in Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 
are actually not “simple” ones. They are derived from sophisticated modeling with 
numerous parameters and then reduced into the concise form. By the methodology of 
decoupling and the concept of equivalent transition rate, the simplified model stands out 
in the form of the component and successfully includes all the significant information of 
the complex interactions among corresponding components due to their protection 
system failures. Thus, it is an important Markov model which completely depicts the 
reliability situation including protection system failures at the current-carrying 
component level. For better understanding, we next give a simple case study as follows 
to illustrate how this simplified model effectively represents the component reliability 
situation including protection system failures. 
The example power system we are using consists of two transmission lines and 
the configuration is the same as shown in Figure 5-2. Suppose the protection system of 
transmission line A (protection A) is designed to provide backup to the protection 
system of transmission line B (protection B). Here we are interested in the reliability 
situation of transmission line A. The necessary reliability parameters of the transmission 
lines and their protection systems are chosen [70], [72] and listed in Table 5-3. 
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Table 5-3  Data for transmission lines and their protection systems 
Transmission lines A B 
j (1/year) 2 2 
j (1/year) 175 -- 
j (1/year) 0.05 -- 
j (1/year) 876 -- 
1jp  -- 0.02 
2jp  -- 0.02 
3jp  -- 0.01 
1j (1/year) -- 876 
2j (1/year) -- 876 
3j (1/year) -- 876 
    Note: j represents A or B 
 
 
The state probabilities of transmission line A considering protection system 
failures are calculated and summarized in Table 5-4. The calculation results with perfect 
protection systems are also provided in the same table for comparison. We can easily see 
from data in Table 5-4 that the protection failures have degraded the reliability situation 
of transmission line A. 
 
 
 
 
 118 
 
 
Table 5-4  State probabilities of transmission line A 
Probabilities Simplified complete model Perfect protection model 
0A
P  (up state) 0.988578 0.988701 
APˆ  (down state) 0.011298 0.011299 
AP  (down state) 0.000056 -- 
11
~
BA
P  (down state) 0.000045 -- 
13
~
BA
P  (down state) 0.000023 -- 
Total down states 0.011422 0.011299 
 
 
5.7. Summary 
 
If protection systems were perfectly reliable, the modeling of current-carrying 
components would be quite simple. However, the consideration of protection system 
failures introduces a significant influence on the modeling. There are two types of 
protection system failures, the undesired-tripping mode and the fail-to-operate mode, 
which can cause difficulties in power system reliability evaluation. 
The undesired-tripping mode protection failure of one component has no 
interaction with other components. We can simply use a two-state process to model the 
effect of this failure mode. The fail-to-operate mode protection failure is represented by 
unreadiness probability. The protection unreadiness probability of one component does 
not affect its own up-and-down status. Nevertheless, it will cause external undesired-
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tripping mode failures to the adjacent component whose protection system is providing 
the backup function. 
By the methodology of interaction decoupling and with the concept of equivalent 
transition rate, we have obtained the complete Markov model for components and then 
derived its simplified form. The simplified model not only contains important 
information of the component itself, but also incorporates significant information of 
related protection system failures for quantitative analysis. It can appropriately describe 
the overall reliability situation of individual components under the circumstances of 
complex interactions between components due to protection system failures [120], [121]. 
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6. NEW MODELS AND CONCEPTS FOR POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
EVALUATION INCLUDING PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURES * 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In Section 5, we have derived the complete Markov model and its simplified 
form for reliability analysis including protection system failures at the current-carrying 
component level. Based on these applicable models, we further aim at developing new 
concepts and models for including protection system failures for application in overall 
power system reliability analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________ 
* Part of this section is reprinted from copyrighted material with permission from IEEE. 
©2009 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, “The 
concept of power unit zone in power system reliability evaluation including protection 
system failures”, in Proc. 2009 IEEE Power & Energy Society Power Systems 
Conference and Exposition (PSCE 2009), pp. 1-10, Mar. 2009. 
©2011 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Kai Jiang and Chanan Singh, “New 
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The objective of this section is to develop concepts and techniques for modeling 
and analyzing the complex and interrelated effects of protection failures resulting in 
isolation of multiple components rather than just the faulted one. It is intuitively clear 
that as multiple outages happen because of protection system failures, the probability of 
cascading failures as a result of post-fault events will be higher than when only one 
component is assumed on outage. The scope of this research is limited to assess the 
probability of multiple component outages resulting from the protection failures. These 
models can also be further combined, if desired, with the models considering cascading 
events as can be the models that do not consider protection failures. 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces new 
concepts of down states and proposes the composite unit model as a key analysis tool. 
Section 6.3 illustrates how to use the composite unit model for reliability evaluation of 
simple power systems in detail. Section 6.4 generalizes the usage of the composite unit 
model for assessing the impact of protection failures on modeling system states and 
develops the methodology for reliability evaluation of large power systems including 
protection system failures. Section 6.5 is the summary of this section. 
 
6.2. Self-down State, Induced-down State, and Composite Unit Model 
 
We usually define the range of a current-carrying component bordered by its 
surrounding circuit breakers. This is also the duty zone that its protection system should 
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protect. From the standpoint of this component range, we recall Figure 5-2 of the 
example power system, Figure 5-9 of the simplified Markov model for component A, 
and Figure 5-10 of the model for component B to deliver new concepts and to derive 
new models for further application. 
 
6.2.1. Self-down State and Induced-down State 
 
In Figure 5-9, all down states of component A can be divided into two parts 
according to the range of component A. The first part is the down states resulting from 
internal causes, which is composed of two states Aˆ  and A . State Aˆ  can be regarded as 
a self-fault-tripping state, while state A  can be seen as a self-undesired-tripping state. 
The second part is the down states from external causes, which comprises the other two 
states 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA . These two states can be deemed as externally-induced-tripping 
states. If we consider the component and its protection within the range together as a 
virtually composite unit, we can alternatively name the first part as self-down state and 
the second part as induced-down state. 
Similarly, all down states of component B in Figure 5-10 can also be summarized 
into these two parts. The self-down state includes two states Bˆ  and B , and the induced-
down state consists of the other two states 12
~
AB  and 13
~
AB . 
For the self-down state, the number and form of its substates are always fixed. In 
addition, the transition rates between the self-down state and the up state of a component 
 123 
 
 
are independent of other components. On the contrary, the induced-down state does not 
have fixed substates. It can be varying due to the coordination design of the backup 
protection systems. The transition rates between the induced-down state and the up state 
of a component definitely depend on other components. 
 
6.2.2. Composite Unit Model 
 
The number of states in component modeling plays an important role in 
reliability evaluation of power systems. The fewer they are, the easier it is for 
application. Therefore, we will merge substates of the self-down state using the concept 
of equivalent transition rate [91] to further reduce the number of states in the previous 
simplified models. 
 
6.2.2.1.  Composite unit model for component A 
 
If we use A  to represent the self-down state of component A, the simplified 
model in Figure 5-9 can be further reduced to the composite unit model as shown in 
Figure 6-1. We have also omitted the subscript “0” of the up state for simplicity, i.e. 
substituting 0A  with A. 
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Figure 6-1.  Composite unit model for component A. 
 
We can obtain the equivalent failure and repair rates between the up state and 
self-down state of the composite unit model for component A, i.e., A  and A , as 
follows. Here we use AP , APˆ , AP , and AP  to represent the probabilities of states A , Aˆ , 
A , and A , respectively. 
In Figure 5-9, for the process between states )0(A  and Aˆ , we have 
 
A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP


  ˆˆ . (6.1) 
For the process between states )0(A  and A , we have 
 
A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP





 . (6.2) 
Since Aˆ  and A  are mutually exclusive states, we can obtain the probability of 
state A  from (6.1) and (6.2) as below. 
 A
A
A
A
A
AAA PPPP 











ˆ  (6.3) 
A A
A
A
11
~
BA 13
~
BA
11
~
BA

13
~
BA

13
~
BA

11
~
BA

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Compare Figure 5-9 and Figure 6-1 using the concept of equivalent transition 
rate, we can easily know that 
 
AAAAAA PPP   . (6.4) 
Hence, the equivalent failure rate is 
 AAA
  . (6.5) 
In Figure 6-1, for the process between states A  and A  we have 
 A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP


  . (6.6) 
If we substitute (6.3) and (6.5) into (6.6), then we get the equivalent repair rate 
 
AAAA
AAAA
A






)(
. (6.7) 
 
6.2.2.2.  Composite unit model for component B 
 
Similarly, we can obtain from the simplified model in Figure 5-10 further to the 
composite unit model for component B as shown in Figure 6-2, in which we use B  to 
represent the self-down state of component B and omit the subscript “0” of the up state 
for simplicity, i.e. substituting 0B  with B. 
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Figure 6-2.  Composite unit model for component B. 
 
In the same way, we can obtain the equivalent failure and repair rates between 
the up state and self-down state of the composite unit model for component B as 
following. 
 BBB    (6.8) 
 BBBB
BBBB
B






)(
 (6.9) 
 
6.3. Illustration of Analyzing Simple Power Systems 
 
With the concept of self-down and induced-down states and the composite unit 
model for current-carrying components, it becomes feasible to analyze the impact of 
protection failures on modeling system states. In this section, we will use the same 
example power system in Figure 5-2 to illustrate how to analyzing a simple power 
system by using the composite unit model. 
 
 
B B
B
B
12
~
AB 13
~
AB
12
~
AB

12
~
AB

13
~
AB
 13
~
AB

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6.3.1. Integration of the Induced-down State 
 
6.3.1.1.  Treatment of component A 
Although substates of the induced-down state of a current-carrying component 
are generally not fixed, they can be determined so long as the coordination design of the 
backup protection systems is clear. For the example power system in Figure 5-2, the 
effect of induced-down state of component A has been modeled by two independent 
two-state processes associated with states 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA  as in Figure 6-1. 
We already know that the two states 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA  in Figure 6-1 are both down 
states of component A caused by the unreadiness probability of protection B. Thus, if we 
use a new general state BA
~
 to represent the down state of component A caused by the 
impact of component B, the two processes regarding states 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA  can be 
combined into a new two-state process associated with state BA
~
 using the concept of 
equivalent transition rate as shown in Figure 6-3. 
 
 
Figure 6-3.  Treatment of the induced-down state of the composite unit model for component A. 
A A
BA
~
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
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
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~
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Suppose the equivalent failure and repair rates of this new process are 
represented by 
BA

~
 and 
BA
~ , respectively. These parameters can be easily derived by the 
frequency balance approach as shown in the following. Here we use AP , 11
~
BA
P , 
13
~
BA
P , and 
BA
P
~
 to represent the probabilities associated with states  A , 11
~
BA , 13
~
BA , and BA
~
, 
respectively. 
For the process between states A  and 11
~
BA , we have 
 A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP
B
B
BBBB
11
11
11111111 ~
~
~~~~


  . (6.10) 
For the process between states A  and 13
~
BA , we have 
 A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP
B
B
BBBB
13
13
13131313 ~
~
~~~~


  . (6.11) 
Since 11
~
BA  and 13
~
BA  are mutually exclusive states, we can obtain the probability 
of state BA
~
 from (6.10) and (6.11) as below. 
 A
A
A
A
A
AAA PPPP
B
B
B
B
BBB 








13
13
11
11
1311 ~
~
~
~
~~~




 (6.12) 
Using the concept of equivalent transition rate, we can know that 
 
1311
~~~
BBB AAAAAA
PPP   . (6.13) 
Hence, the equivalent failure rate is 
 1311
~~~
BBB AAA
  . (6.14) 
 129 
 
 
For the process between states A  and BA
~
 we have 
 A
A
A
AAAAA PPPP
B
B
BBBB 

 ~
~
~~~~  . (6.15) 
If we substitute (6.12) and (6.14) into (6.15), we get the equivalent repair rate 
 
11131311
13111311
~~~~
)
~~
(~~~
BBBB
BBBB
B
AAAA
AAAA
A





 . (6.16) 
Note equations (5.9) and (5.10) for the details of 
11
~
BA
 , 
11
~
BA
 , 
13
~
BA
 , and 
13
~
BA
 . 
Substitute them into (6.14) and (6.16), then the equivalent transition rates 
BA

~
 and 
BA
~  
are finally represented by 
 BBBA ppB  )(
~
31  , (6.17) 
 1331
3131 )(~
BBBB
BBBB
A
pp
pp
B 




 . (6.18) 
After above integration treatment of the induced-down state, the composite unit 
model for component A in Figure 6-1 is now reduced to a concise three-state model as 
shown in Figure 6-4. The parameters of this model refer to equations (6.5), (6.7), (6.17), 
and (6.18). 
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Figure 6-4.  Three-state model for component A. 
 
6.3.1.2.  Treatment of component B 
 
In the same way, we can also reduce the composite unit model for component B 
in Figure 6-2 to the three-state model as shown in Figure 6-5. 
 
 
Figure 6-5.  Three-state model for component B. 
 
In Figure 6-5, the new state AB
~
 represents the down state of component B caused 
by the impact of component A, which equivalently replaces the two induced down states 
12
~
AB  and 13
~
AB  in Figure 6-2. The equivalent failure and repair rates B  and B  of this 
B
B
B
AB
~
AB

~
AB
~
B
A
A
A
BA
~
BA

~
BA
~
A
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model refer to equations (6.8) and (6.9), respectively. The equivalent failure and repair 
rates 
AB

~
 and 
AB
~  can also be easily derived by the frequency balance approach and the 
resulting expression is given below. 
 AAAB ppA  )(
~
32   (6.19) 
 2332
3232 )(~
AAAA
AAAA
B
pp
pp
A 




  (6.20) 
 
6.3.2. Reliability Evaluation of the Example Power System 
 
In a power system, the system state is determined by the status of its current-
carrying components. Since each of components A and B has three states as shown in 
Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5, the example power system in Figure 5-2 should theoretically 
have nine system states, which can be represented by AB , BA , ABA
~
, BA , BA , ABA
~
, 
BAB
~
, BAB
~
, and AB BA
~~
, respectively. However, there are actually three impossible 
system states which are ABA
~
, BAB
~
 and AB BA
~~
. 
For the system state BAB
~
, we already know that BA
~
 is the induced-down state of 
component A. As we can see from the previous interaction decoupling in Figure 5-5, 
component B is always down simultaneously as long as component A is transferred into 
its induced-down state. Thus, component A cannot be in the induced-down state if 
component B is in the up state, which means that the system state BAB
~
 cannot exist. For 
the same reason (refer to Figure 5-6), the system state ABA
~
 cannot exist, too. 
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For the system state AB BA
~~
, we have previously assumed that all the backup 
functions are perfectly reliable. In addition, we can see from Figure 5-5 that the induced-
down state of component A not only is always accompanied by the self-down state of 
component B, but also has already returned to the up state of component A before 
component B leaves its self-down state. Similarly, we can see from Figure 5-6 that the 
induced-down state of component B not only is always accompanied by the self-down 
state of component A, but also has already returned to the up state of component B 
before component A leaves its self-down state. Hence, the system state AB BA
~~
 indeed 
cannot exist. 
The above information simply indicates that the probabilities of system states 
ABA
~
, BAB
~
 and AB BA
~~
 are all zero and we do not need to consider them anymore. 
Therefore, the example power system has only six possible system states and we can 
directly draw the system state transition diagram as shown in Figure 6-6. Note in the 
single transition from system state AB  to system state BA , the failure rate becomes 
)
~
(
BAB
   instead of just B . This is because as component B is considered in the 
system state AB , the failure rate 
BA

~
 is actually a portion of B  and is already 
distributed to another single transition from system state AB  to system state BAB
~
. The 
relationship detail between 
BA

~
 and B  refers to equations (6.8) and (6.17). For the same 
reason, the failure rate of the single transition from system state AB  to system state BA  
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becomes )
~
(
ABA
   instead of just A . The relationship detail between AB
~
 and A  
refers to equations (6.5) and (6.19). 
 
 
Figure 6-6.  System state transition diagram of the example power system. 
 
By using the frequency balance approach for Figure 6-6, the probability of each 
system state and the reliability indices such as the Loss Of Load Expectation (LOLE) 
and the Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) can all be easily figured out for the example 
power system. 
Here we use 1P , 2P , 3P , 4P , 5P , and 6P  to represent the probabilities associated 
with system states AB , BA , BA , BA , BAB
~
, and ABA
~
, respectively. In order to find 
these probabilities, we write an equation of frequency balance for each of the six system 
states. 
For the system state AB , we have 
 )(132 BAAB PPP   . (6.21) 
AB BA
BA BA
ABA
~
BAB
~
B
)
~
(
BAB
 B
B
)
~
(
ABA
 
A
AA
AB

~
AB
~
BA

~
BA
~
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For the system state BA , we have 
 )(~)
~
( 2541 BAAAAB PPPP BB   . (6.22) 
For the system state BA , we have 
 )(~)
~
( 3641 BABBBA PPPP AA   . (6.23) 
For the system state BA , we have 
 )(432 BABA PPP   . (6.24) 
For the system state BAB
~
, we have 
 
BB AA
PP  ~
~
51  . (6.25) 
For the system state ABA
~
, we have 
 
AA BB
PP  ~
~
61  . (6.26) 
Since the probabilities of system states ABA
~
, BAB
~
 and AB BA
~~
 are all zero, we get 
 1
6
1

i
iP . (6.27) 
Using any five of the six equations (6.21)-(6.26) together with equation (6.27), 
we can solve and obtain the state probabilities. 
For the example power system in Figure 5-2, the Loss Of Load Expectation 
(LOLE) and the Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) are calculated as below. 
 (h/year)    8760)( 654  PPPLOLE  (6.28) 
 (MWh/year)    LOLELEUE   (6.29) 
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6.3.3. Numerical Case Study 
 
Now we use some numerical data to illustrate the impact of protection system 
failures on reliability evaluation of the example power system. The necessary parameters 
of current-carrying components and their protection systems are chosen [70], [72] and 
listed in Table 6-1. 
 
Table 6-1  Parameters of components and their protection systems 
Components A B 
j  (1/year) 2 2 
j  (1/year) 175 175 
j  (1/year) 0.05 0.05 
j  (1/year) 876 876 
1jp  0.02 0.02 
2jp  0.02 0.02 
3jp  0.01 0.01 
1j  (1/year) 876 876 
2j  (1/year) 876 876 
3j  (1/year) 876 876 
L (MW) 10 
    Note: j represents A or B 
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The reliability indices of the example power system are calculated and 
summarized in Table 6-2. The corresponding results with the perfect protection model 
are also provided for comparison. It is obvious that protection system failures do have 
influence on probabilities of all the system states. For the reliability indices LOLE and 
EUE, we find that they both have been doubled over those of the perfect protection 
model. Thus, the reliability situation of the example power system has been degraded 
tremendously due to the impact of protection system failures. 
 
Table 6-2  Reliability indices of the example power system 
Reliability indices Composite unit model Perfect protection model 
1P  (state AB ) 0.977288 0.977529 
2P  (state BA ) 0.011225 0.011172 
3P  (state BA ) 0.011225 0.011172 
4P  (state BA ) 0.000129 0.000128 
5P  (state BAB
~
) 0.000067 -- 
6P  (state ABA
~
) 0.000067 -- 
LOLE (h/year) 2.302 1.118 
EUE (MWh/year) 23.021 11.185 
 
Since components A and B in a sense are symmetrical in the example power 
system of Figure 5-2, we change parameters of protection B only to see the trend how 
protection failure rates influence the system reliability. Table 6-3 gives the computation 
results of reliability indices for different protection failure rates of component B with all 
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other parameters the same as in Table 6-1. Here we need to point out that the reliability 
indices assuming perfect protection model will remain the same as in Table 6-2 because 
no change happens on the component transition rates. From Table 6-3, we can easily see 
that the system reliability indices become much greater as protection system failures are 
considered. 
Table 6-3  Reliability indices for different protection failure rates 
Unreadiness 
probability 1Bp  
Failure rate B   
(1/year) 
Loss Of Load Expectation 
(LOLP) 
Expected Unserved Energy 
(EUE) (MWh/year) 
0.02 0.05 2.302 23.021 
0.02 0.10 2.308 23.076 
0.02 0.25 2.324 23.240 
0.02 0.50 2.351 23.514 
0.02 1.00 2.406 24.062 
0.05 0.05 2.888 28.883 
0.05 0.10 2.894 28.937 
0.05 0.25 2.910 29.101 
0.05 0.50 2.937 29.373 
0.05 1.00 2.992 29.917 
0.10 0.05 3.865 38.651 
0.10 0.10 3.870 38.705 
0.10 0.25 3.887 38.867 
0.10 0.50 3.914 39.136 
0.10 1.00 3.967 39.675 
Perfect protection model 1.118 11.185 
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Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8 are diagrams of the incremental percentage of EUE 
versus B   and 1Bp , respectively. From Figure 6-7 we find that as the undesired-tripping 
mode protection failure rate increases, the expected unserved energy of the example 
power system will increase accordingly. From Figure 6-8 we see that the expected 
unserved energy will also increase as the unreadiness probability of the fail-to-operate 
mode protection failure increases. If we look at these two diagrams together, we can 
intuitively see that EUE is by far more sensitive to parameter 1Bp  than to B  . It simply 
indicates that there could be significant errors in reliability evaluation of power systems 
if we ignore protection system failures especially the fail-to-operate mode protection 
failures. 
The diagrams of incremental percentage of LOLE versus B   and 1Bp  are quite 
similar to Figure 6-7 and Figure 6-8. We can also find the same conclusion for LOLE as 
above for EUE. It sounds reasonable as we can see from (6.29) that EUE and LOLE are 
linearly correlated for our numerical case study. 
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Figure 6-7.  Incremental percentage of the Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) vs. undesired-tripping mode 
protection failure rate ( B  ). 
 
 
Figure 6-8.  Incremental percentage of the Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) vs. unreadiness probability 
of fail-to-operate mode protection failure ( 1Bp ). 
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6.4. Methodology for Analyzing Large Power Systems 
 
For large power systems, more challenges can be expected than those of simple 
ones like the example power system we analyzed in Section 6.3. Since there are a lot of 
components in a large power system, the system states are far more in numbers and the 
protection coordination is much more complex. In a practical power system, every 
current-carrying component is primarily protected by its own protective relays. In 
addition, almost each component is further protected by backup protection from adjacent 
component protection zones. Thus, it is important to model the system states and their 
relationships in a general form. 
 
6.4.1. Impact of Protection Failures on Modeling System States 
 
We can still use the concept of self-down and induced-down states and the 
composite unit model for current-carrying components to analyze the impact of 
protection failures on modeling system states. As we have mentioned before, a 
component may associate with more than two breakers. But we still prefer to assume 
only two equivalent breakers for a component so as to deliver the concept and to 
illustrate the model clearer. 
Suppose arbitrarily a component i is connected through its breakers i1 and i2 to 
two sets of adjacent components, say H and J, respectively. As shown in Figure 6-9, h 
and j are arbitrary components of these two sets, respectively. 
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Figure 6-9.  Component i and its adjacent components. 
 
If there is no component induced-down state, the system state would be a simple 
combination of component self-down states because the self-down state of a component 
is independent of each other. The single-step transition rates between any two system 
states would be the equivalent failure and repair rates of the composite unit model for the 
component, say i, which changes its status in this transition. Similar to expressions (6.5) 
and (6.7), or (6.8) and (6.9), we can obtain without difficulty the formulae to calculate 
these transition rates of component i as follows. 
 
iiii
iiii
iiii






)(
          ,  (6.30) 
However, the existence of component induced-down states makes the system 
state more complicated. Besides the system states consisting of component self-down 
states only, there are some new system states comprised of both component self-down 
and induced-down states. For each new system state, the component induced-down 
states are dependent on and can only be together with a specific component self-down 
ih

j



1i 2i
H J
 142 
 
 
state which contains the inducing source, i.e. the unreadiness probability of protection 
failures. It will be clearer to illustrate this by Figure 6-10. 
 
 
Figure 6-10.  Impact of protection failures on modeling system states. 
 
In Figure 6-10, component i is considered for a single-step transition. The system 
states )  (  i  and )  (  i  have all components in the same status except 
component i being up and down, respectively. These two system states merely consist of 
self-down states. 
Suppose there is at least one adjacent component Hh  and Jj  which is in 
the up state and provides backup protection to component i. According to different cases 
of protection unreadiness probability of component i, there will be three possible new 
system states ) 
~
(  iH , )
~
 (  Ji , and )
~~
(  JiH  which are 
comprised of component self-down and induced-down states. For example, in the system 
state ) 
~
(  iH , all components of set H previously being in the up state are now in 
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their induced-down state together with component i being in its self-down state, and the 
status of all other components are the same as those in system states )  (  i  and 
)  (  i . From previous component modeling analysis we know that the transition 
rates associated with this system state ) 
~
(  iH  are iip 1  and 1i  as shown in 
Figure 6-10. Similar explanations also apply to modeling system states )
~
 (  Ji  
and )
~~
(  JiH . 
Since new system states have been added, the transition rates between system 
states  )  (  i  and )  (  i  may need to be modified. Specifically, the failure 
rate can no longer be i  because the failure rates iip 1 , iip 2 , and iip 3  associated with 
unreadiness probabilities allocated to the three new system states in Figure 6-10 should 
be subtracted from i . From expression (6-30) and previous simplification process 
illustrated in Figure 5-8, it is not difficult to know that the resulting failure rate after this 
subtraction is )( 0 iiip   . As for the repair rate i , there is no need to change at all. 
 
 
6.4.2. Markov Modeling of Power Systems with Protection Failures 
 
6.4.2.1.  Reliability modeling of power systems with perfect protections 
 
We normally assume that the failure mode of a current-carrying component due 
to faults on itself is independent. If the protection systems are perfect, the reliability 
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modeling of power systems is a one-layer Markov processes as shown in Figure 6-11. In 
this figure, each block represents a system state and all transitions between any two 
system states are single-step transitions. 
 
6.4.2.2.  Reliability modeling of power systems with protection failures 
 
However, the impact of protection failures on modeling system states will also 
influence the reliability modeling of power systems shown in Figure 6-11. From the 
previous analysis in Section 6.4.1, we see that for every single-step transition of 
component i, there will be a group of three new system states added reflecting 
interactions and dependencies of current-carrying components. This group of states is 
attached to and forms a closed loop along with the independent single-step transition as 
shown in Figure 6-10. Considering arbitrariness in the selection of component i, the 
reliability modeling of power systems including protection system failures will be a two-
layer Markov processes as illustrated in Figure 6-12. 
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Figure 6-11.  Reliability modeling of power systems with perfect protections. 
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Figure 6-12.  Reliability modeling of power systems with protection failures. 
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The first layer is shown as the bold part in Figure 6-12, which we name the 
primary layer. The primary layer Markov processes consist of only the independent 
system states with single-step transitions. Although, in structure, it looks the same as if 
we model power systems with perfect protections in Figure 6-11, it has totally different 
meanings and transition rates for its system states are different. 
The second layer is shown as the dotted part in Figure 6-12. It is a dependent 
layer attached to the primary one, reflecting interactions and dependencies of current-
carrying components by the impact of protection system failures. Each element of the 
second layer is actually a group of system states with common mode failures, which has 
been analyzed in detail just in the previous content of Section 6.4.1. 
It is evident that system states in the second layer have more components down 
simultaneously than the corresponding system states of the primary layer, which 
generally indicates worse situation for system reliability. Since elements of the second 
layer are attached to every single-step transition in the primary layer, we can have an 
intuitive sense why protection failures could worsen the power system reliability. 
 
6.4.2.3.  Methodology for power system reliability evaluation 
 
The general methodology for power system reliability evaluation including 
protection system failures can be stated as follows. 
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(1) Set up the primary layer Markov processes as if with perfect protection 
systems. The single-step failure and repair rates of a given component i are i  and i , 
respectively. 
(2) Replace the transition rates by component self-down failure and repair rates, 
i.e. i  and i , as given in expression (6.30). The primary layer Markov process has 
been updated to include undesired-tripping mode protection failures. 
(3) Set up the second layer Markov processes and attach it to the primary layer as 
shown in Figure 6-10 and Figure 6-12. Then modify the failure rate of the primary layer 
from i  to )( 0 iiip   . Now the fail-to-operate mode protection failures are also 
integrated into the system model. 
(4) Evaluate the power system reliability. 
 
 
6.4.3. Power System Reliability Evaluation Including Protection System Failures 
 
There are two general approaches for reliability assessment of a system: the 
analytical method and the simulation method. For the system Markov model already set 
up in the previous Section 6.4.2, applications of these two approaches are illustrated as 
follows. 
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6.4.3.1.  Analytical method 
 
Although various analytical methods exist for assessing the system reliability, 
their applications to reliability evaluation of power systems with protection failures 
could be restricted. The main reason for this is the dependence of failures as we can see 
from the system Markov model in Figure 6-12. 
Nevertheless, the frequency balance approach can still be used for steady state 
analysis in spite of dependencies in the system. For each system state of the Markov 
processes in Figure 6-10, we can write an equation of frequency balance as below. 
For the system state )  (  i , we have 
 )()( )()(  
n
niii
m
mmii
PPP   . (6.31) 
For the system state ) 
~
(  iH , we have 
 1)~(1)( iiHiii PpP    . (6.32) 
For the system state )
~
 (  Ji , we have 
 2)~(2)( iJiiii PpP    . (6.33) 
For the system state )
~~
(  JiH , we have 
 3)~~(3)( iJiHiii PpP    . (6.34) 
For the system state )  (  i , we have 
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Here )(P  represents the probability of system state )( . The subscripts m and n 
are used for other system states not seen from Figure 6-10 but existing in Figure 6-12 
with direct transitions to and from system state )  (  i , respectively. Similar 
explanation applies to subscripts r and s with respect to system state )  (  i . We 
also use the symbol   to represent the corresponding transition rates. 
If there are finite number, say  , of system states, we can theoretically obtain a 
set of   such equations. Then we solve for system state probabilities combining any 
1  equations with the following total probability equation. 
 1
1



k
kP  (6.36) 
It is obvious that this approach is only suitable for systems with a small number 
of system states. For a large power system, the state space could be so huge that it 
becomes impractical to solve simultaneous equations for all the system states. Thus, a 
feasible simulation method is proposed as following for handling large power systems. 
 
6.4.3.2.  Monte Carlo simulation method 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation methods can be classified into two categories: 
random sampling and sequential simulation. The random sampling approach is non-
sequential and thus difficult to deal with cases of dependent transition modes such as our 
system Markov model. So, the sequential simulation approach is selected and the system 
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states are generated sequentially by transition from one state to the next using probability 
distributions of component state durations and the random numbers [122], [123]. 
Suppose a component i with its state duration represented by a random variable 
iD . If iZ  is a random number, then the observation of iD  can be obtained by 
 )(
1
iii zFd
  (6.37) 
wherein iF  is the duration distribution function of component i. For exponential 
distribution, (6.37) would be 
 
i
i
i
z
d

)ln(
  (6.38) 
wherein i  is the transition rate of component i. 
Although the component with minimal time makes a transition and causes system 
transition as in the standard simulation procedure, two special treatments are necessary 
during the simulation to accommodate our system modeling. 
The special treatment type I is for component transitions from its up state to self-
down states. As we can see in Figure 6-10, there are four such possible transitions for 
component i with transition rates )( 0 iiip   , iip 1 , iip 2 , and iip 3 , respectively. 
Since all these transitions are independent of other components, this is actually a 
multistate problem in sequential simulation. It can be handled by using four random 
numbers to generate four transition time values with respect to these possible transitions. 
Then the transition with the minimal value is chosen as the effective for simulation 
process [124]. 
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The special treatment type II is for component transitions into and out from 
induced-down states. Since a certain component induced-down state is dependent on 
some other component, such a transition is passive and we cannot assign it an extra 
random number to avoid transition time conflict with the self-down and/or switching 
transitions inducing it. Instead we handle the case in the way described as follows. 
If component i is sampled in the up state and chosen for the next system event 
with the transition time iT  obtained from its transition rate iip 1  using (6.38), it means 
that the system will change after time iT  from system state )  (  i  to system state 
) 
~
(  iH  as shown in Figure 6-10. Then at the moment of this transition, besides 
handling component i, we also need to check the status of all components belonging to 
set H. For those components already in down states (their protection systems thus cannot 
provide backup function), nothing needs to be done. But for each component in the up 
state, we need to change it to the down state so as to reflect the dependent induced-down 
transition. In addition, we override the transition time of this component with a new 
value the same as the switching time of component i with respect to the switching rate 
1i . Thus, the switching process is also simulated. 
Now we give the steps of the whole simulation algorithm: 
Suppose the thn  transition has just taken place at time nt . 
Step 1) Determine the value of iT , the effective time to the next transition of  
component i. 
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Case a) If component i is in the up state, iT  is obtained using the special 
treatment type I described previously. 
Case b) If component i is in one of its self-down state with unreadiness 
probabilities, check all its adjacent components on the 
corresponding side and make necessary changes using the special 
treatment type II described previously. 
Case c) For all other cases, iT  is obtained in the normal way using (6.38), 
no special action needs to be taken. 
Step 2) The time to the next system transition is given by 
 
}min{ iTT  . (6.39) 
If this T  corresponds to pT , the next transition is determined by the thp
component. Note that there could be several such components to change 
their states simultaneously due to Case b) of Step 1). 
Step 3) The simulation time is now advanced. 
 Ttt nn 1  (6.40) 
Step 4) The residual time to transition of component i is 
 TTT i
r
i  . (6.41) 
Step 5) The residual time for component p causing the transition becomes zero 
and the time to its next transition pT  is determined the same as in Step 1). 
Step 6) The time iT  is then set as 
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Step 7) From nt  to 1nt , the status of equipment stays fixed and the following 
steps are performed. 
(a) The load for each node is updated to current hour. 
(b) If no node has load loss, the simulation proceeds to the next hour, 
otherwise remedial actions are called. 
(c) If after remedial actions all loads are satisfied, then simulation 
proceeds to next hour. Otherwise, this is counted as loss of load hour 
for those nodes and the system. If in the previous hour there was no 
load loss, it is counted as one event of loss of load. 
(d) Repeat steps (a)-(c) until simulation time 1nt . 
Step 8) Go back to Step 2) and continue the simulation until convergence 
criterion is satisfied or the preset maximal number of simulation is 
reached. 
Step 9) Terminate the simulation and calculate reliability indices as needed. 
 
 
6.4.4. Numerical Case Study 
 
The 24-bus IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) is used for our numerical case 
study and the one-line diagram of this power system is shown in Figure 6-13 [125], 
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[126]. The original parameters of current-carrying components are used with a flat load 
curve of the annual peak load for 8760 hourly values. However, important parameters 
associated with protection system failures are not a part of the RTS database. 
It is necessary to point out here that data are of great significance for model 
application and system evaluation. As to the protective relays, the reliability 
characteristics are quite different for various types such as electromechanical relays, 
analog electronic relays, and microprocessor-based relays. Even for the same type of 
equipments, their reliability behavior could be influenced by many factors such as 
installation environment, test interval, and maintenance quality. Thus, the reliability 
parameters of each practical protection system can be regarded as “unique”. For 
important parameters such as undesired-tripping failure rate i  and the unreadiness 
probability ikp , they can be computed by appropriately developed reliability models if 
the failure and repair rates of elements of protection systems are known [69], [80]. As an 
alternative approach, these parameters could also be estimated from field data using the 
following equations. 
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Figure 6-13.  24-bus IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS). 
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Here ikN  is the number of times all breakers in subset kI  fail to trip, and tcN  is the 
number of trip commands [80]. In practice, these estimated parameters should be 
accumulating data, which means that not only the historical information representing the 
past transition behavior needs to be collected, but also new information about recent 
failures when available should be included to keep the parameters updated. 
Since protection data for components of RTS are currently unavailable, we 
assume for simplicity that all protections have the same behavior. A set of protection 
reliability parameters is adopted based on reasonable estimation from various sources 
such as research, testing, and experience data [70]-[72], [76]-[78], [125], [126]. 
(1) Protection failure rate 
The protection failure rate is often shown in the range of 0.01-0.5/year without 
indicating distinct types. Sometimes failure rate data are given for undesired-tripping 
mode between 0.01-0.08/year and for fail-to-operate mode 0.1-0.4/year. By comparison, 
we see that the fail-to-operate mode dominates the two types of protection failures. 
Conservatively, we take the value of 0.05/year for the undesired-tripping mode 
protection failures. 
We observe from RTS data that the transmission line outage rate mainly resides 
in the range of 1-3/year, given both permanent and transient outages are considered. 
 158 
 
Thus we take about 5% of the component outages accounting for hidden protection 
failures. It yields the fail-to-operate mode protection failure rate to be 0.05-0.15/year, 
which we think is reasonable based on previous discussion of data. 
For the current-carrying component model used in our research, the two breakers 
are considered identical in behavior and have the same chance of consequences due to 
fail-to-operate protection failures. However, the probability of both breakers failing to 
operate should be much less than only one of them failing to operate. Therefore, the 5% 
of the component outages is further decomposed into 2%, 2%, and 1% for three types of 
unreadiness probabilities. Of course the remaining 95% are for component outages 
without protection failures. 
(2) Protection repair rate 
The majority of data show that the protection repair process in power industry 
can be done within 2-10 hours, though some extreme data indicate that the length could 
be as long as 40 hours. Conservatively, we consider that 10 hours would be an 
appropriate estimate, yielding the repair rate to be 876/year. 
(3) Switching rate 
Given a faulted component fails to trip, its adjacent healthy components will be 
tripped quickly by backup protections. However, switching these tripped healthy 
components back to service could take quite a few hours. It can only be carried out after 
some checking processes including but not limited to investigating tripping causes, 
locating the actual fault, and manually isolating the faulted components, etc. So, we 
consider 10 hours as appropriate for all model applications.\ 
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The protection reliability parameters we adopted are summarized in Table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-4  Parameters associated with protection system failures 
Parameters  Values   Parameters  Values   
i  (1/year) 0.05 i  (1/year) 876 
1ip  0.02 1i  (1/year) 876 
2ip  0.02 2i  (1/year) 876 
3ip  0.01 3i  (1/year) 876 
0ip  0.95 -- -- 
 
 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation is used for evaluating the system reliability. The 
reliability indices are estimated by the sequential simulation method programmed in 
MATPOWER software [127]. Figure 6-14 is a sampling of the system Loss Of Load 
Probability (LOLP) with 100,000 samples. 
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Figure 6-14.  Sampling of the system Loss Of Load Probability (LOLP). 
 
 
Figure 6-15 gives the system reliability indices of LOLP and frequency of system 
loss of load, compared with the corresponding results of the model assuming perfectly 
reliable protections. The results in Figure 6-15 have quantified the expectation that 
protection system failures do have an influence on system reliability. We can see that 
these indices show an increase over those of the perfect protection model. Thus, the 
system reliability situation has been degraded due to the impact of protection failures. 
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Figure 6-15.  System reliability indices. 
 
 
6.5. Summary 
 
For the purpose of application in the overall power system reliability analysis 
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impact of protection failures on modeling system states. Finally, the reliability Markov 
model of power systems with protection failures has been proposed. The methodology 
for reliability evaluation of power systems including protection system failures is also 
illustrated in detail. From the numerical case studies, we can see that assumption of 
perfectly reliable protection can introduce errors in power system reliability evaluation 
[120], [121]. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The reliability of protection systems has critical influence on the reliability of 
power systems. The existence of protection failures can significantly impact reliability 
evaluation of power systems. According to the nature of the problem, the hierarchical 
layers of three levels have been proposed. These layers provide a broad view of how the 
problems concerning protection system failures relate to each other. However, this 
research does not intend to cover everything but focuses on the following issues within 
the proposed three layers. 
(1) Research scope of Layer 1: Reliability modeling of all-digital protection 
systems including special protection systems with consideration of repair; 
(2) Research scope of Layer 2: Modeling the overall reliability situation of 
current-carrying components including protection system failures; 
(3) Research scope of Layer 3: Developing applicable methodology for power 
system reliability evaluation including protection system failures. 
 
7.1. Summary of Contributions 
 
The contributions of this research are summarized as follows. 
(1) Section 2 explores the impact of including component repair on the reliability 
modeling of all-digital protection systems. It is shown that repairable and non-repairable 
assumptions make a remarkable difference in the computed reliability indices of the 
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MTTF and MTTFF. A typical all-digital protection system architecture is modeled and 
numerically analyzed. Some interesting results are found by comparing reliability 
indices of MTTF and MTTFF and explanations of these results are provided. 
(2) Section 3 proposes a conceptual all-digital SPS architecture for the future 
smart grid. The smart grid is emerging with the penetration of information-age 
technologies and the development of the SPS will be greatly influenced. The focus of 
this section is how to apply reliability analysis approaches to the new all-digital SPS 
schemes. Calculation of important reliability indices by the network reduction method 
and the Markov modeling method is illustrated in detail. 
(3) Section 4 focuses on reliability modeling of the 2-out-of-3 voting gates 
structure in a generation rejection scheme. Due to different assumptions, two 
corresponding Markov models are proposed for reliability evaluation. The major 
difference between these two models is whether the failures of a logic gate are 
distinguished as detectable or undetectable. The numerical case study shows that the 
reliability indices obtained from these two models could be very different. 
(4) Section 5 reconsiders reliability modeling of current-carrying components 
including protection system failures from a new perspective. The two types of protection 
failures, i.e. undesired-tripping mode and fail-to-operate mode, and their impact on 
reliability modeling are discussed. A complete Markov model is established and its 
simplified form is then derived. The simplified model not only contains important 
information of the component itself, but also incorporates significant information of 
related protection system failures for quantitative analysis. 
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(5) Section 6 develops new models and concepts for incorporating the effect of 
protection system failures into power system reliability evaluation. New concepts of the 
self-down state and the induced-down state are introduced and then utilized to build up 
the composite unit model. This new model is the key for quantitatively assessing the 
influence of protection failures on modeling system states. Finally, a two-layer Markov 
model for power systems with protection failures is proposed for system reliability 
evaluation. The proposed methodology is also illustrated in detail. 
 
7.2. Research Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of this research are summarized as following. 
(1) Repair plays an important role in reliability modeling of all-digital protection 
systems concerning MTTF and MTTFF. If an all-digital protection system is indeed 
repairable but is modeled in a non-repairable manner for analysis, the calculated values 
for the MTTF and MTTFF could be grossly pessimistic. 
(2) If components tend to be less reliable, the SPS reliability will be degraded. 
However, increasing component repair rates will be helpful to enhance the reliability of 
SPS. The approaches applied in this research can quantify these effects and help in cost-
benefit trade-off and selection of components as well as configurations. 
(3) If the Markov model with consideration of both detectable and undetectable 
logic gate failures is used as a benchmark, the simple Markov model which only 
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considers detectable failures will significantly overestimate the reliability of the 2-out-
of-3 voting gates structure in a generation rejection scheme. 
(4) The simplified complete Markov model for current-carrying components is 
applicable for quantitative analysis. It can appropriately describe the overall reliability 
situation of individual components under the circumstances of complex interactions 
between components due to protection system failures. 
(5) The proposed composite unit model and the two-layer system Markov model 
can quantify the impact of protection failures on power system reliability evaluation. 
Using the developed methodology, we can see that assumption of perfectly reliable 
protection can introduce errors in reliability evaluation of power systems. 
 
7.3. Suggestions for Future Work 
 
It is worth noting that although the scope of this research is limited to assessment 
of the probability of multiple component outages resulting from the protection failures, 
these models can be further combined with the models considering cascading events as 
can be the models that do not consider protection failures. 
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APPENDIX: DISTRIBUTIONS OF SWITCHING AND REPAIR TIMES 
 
It has been shown in [128] that for calculation of steady state probabilities and 
frequencies, irrespective of the form of distribution, an equivalent constant transition rate 
from state i to state j can be given by 
 


k
ikik
ij
ij


 , 
wherein 
ij = transition probability from state i to state j, 
ik = mean duration of state i given that the next transition is to state k. 
Now if there is only one possible transition from state i to state j, then 1ij  and 
thus 
 
ij
ij


1
 . 
For this situation, for steady state calculations, one can always use the reciprocal 
of the mean time of residence in the state as a constant transition rate which implies an 
exponential distribution. In other words, in this case, irrespective of the actual form of 
the distribution one can always assume exponential distribution without introducing any 
error. 
